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ADVANCING THE LANGUAGE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER:
AN ANALYSIS OF A DISCOURSE
CHRISTIANA OCHOA*
Abstract: Human rights language is particularly attuned to setting out
the goals of protecting the world's least protected people. As human
rights advocates have entered negotiations with international economic
institutions and transnational corporations (TNCs), such negotiations
have often resulted in an alternative language to describe the necessity
of protecting and promoting human rights. After describing the
progressive inclusion of human rights ideas by TNCs, the World Bank,
the IMF, and the WTO, this Article argues that, while such inclusion is a
benefit to the human rights movement, the creation of an alternative
language to describe human rights goals is potentially detrimental. The
language of human rights, in order to be understood by those it aims to
protect, must, above all, be intelligible and accessible to them. At this
early stage of interactions between human rights advocates and
international economic actors, human rights advocates should retain
and advance the compelling and utopian language of rights.
Commerce, however necessary, however lucrative, as it depraves the man-
ners, corrupts the language; they that have frequent intercourse with
strangers, to whom they endeavor to accommodate themselves, must in time
learn a mingled dialect.... This will not always be confined to the ex-
change, the warehouse, or the port, but will be communicated by degrees to
other ranks of the people, and be at last incorporated with the current
speech.
-Samuel Johnson'
* J.D., Harvard Law School (1998), B.A., University of Michigan (1993). Christiana
Ochoa is a past associate of the New York office of the law firm Clifford Chance. She has
worked as a visiting professor at the University of the Andes in Bogoit, Colombia and has
worked for a number of human rights organizations throughout Latin America. The
author would like to thank Timothy Lynch, Christiana Zilke, Todd Ochoa, Max Ochoa,
William Aceves, Erin Han, Kara DelTufo, and Michelle Picheny for their thoughtful com-
ments to this Article.
1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, SAMUEL JOHNSON's DICTIONARY: A MODERN SELECTION 25 (E.L.
McAdam, Jr. & George Milne eds., 1964) (1755).
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INTRODUCTION
The philosophical origins of human rights as we know them are
as recent as modernity.2 As such, the community of human rights ad-
vocates is recent, and the language it uses to articulate its demands
and goals remains in flux. The myriad debates defending or advanc-
ing a particular definition for a specific human rights problem or
transgressive occurrence abound as evidence of this phenomenon. 3
As with any specialized field of study and work-including law4-hu-
man rights has developed its own "language for a special purpose."5
Specialized lexicons have also developed in areas relevant to human
rights, such as economics, finance, and the phenomenon of globaliza-
tion.6 Moreover, because economics, globalization, and human rights
are not entirely independent of one another, they experience cross-
pollination of their communities and specialty languages.
This Article discusses characteristics of two of these discourses,
that of international economic law and that of human rights, and the
points of contact between the two. Although they share philosophical
roots in liberal ideals, human rights and international economic law
2 See, e.g., Kenneth Minogue, The History of the Idea of Human Rights, in HUM. Rrs.
READER 3, 3-5 (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 1989). "It is easy enough to give a date
to inventions like the steam engine, but to say when an idea first became current is much
more difficult. In trying to detect this moment, we must use the familiar distinction be-
tween the medieval and the modern world." Id. at 5.
3 For example, the definition of trafficking in women continues to be highly con-
tested. See, e.g., Janie Chuang, Redirecting the Debate over Trafficking in Women: Definitions,
Paradigms, and Contexts, II HARV. HUM. Ris.J. 65, 65-68 (1998); Stephanie Farrior, The
International Law on Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution: Making It Live Up to Its
Potential, 10 HARv. HUM. R-rs.J. 213, 214-16 (1997); SusanJeanne Toepfer & Bryan Stuart
Wells, The Worldwide Market for Sex: A Review of International and Regional Legal Prohibitions
Regarding Trafficking in Women, 2 MICH.J. GENDER & L. 83, 91-93 (1994).
4 See ROBIN TOLMACI LAKOFF, TALKING POWER 102 (1990).
5 The terms "specialized languages," "professional languages," and "languages for spe-
cial purposes" are used synonymously herein and are the terms used in linguistic studies to
explain the phenomenon of languages formed by a specific profession to adequately ex-
press the nuances that develop in the pursuit of that profession.
Language for special purposes is like a microscope in areas where technical
registers develop. Likewise, only small fragments of reality are made the sub-
ject of discussion, and from a very peculiar viewpoint at that. Yet the vocabu-
lary that is necessary for taking part in such a discussion is far greater than
the lexicon of general language.
FLORIAN COULMAS, LANGUAGE AND ECONoMY 276-77 (1992).
6 See generally KNUANNE ANTIHONY & HENRY LOUIS GATES, TnE DICTONARY OF GLOBAL
CULT1URE 520 (1997) (defining important cultural contributions and traditions from vari-
ous regions around the world).
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stand as polarized communities, as a result of a decades-long creation
of separate instruments and institutions. 7 This separation, however,
has never been absolute. In recent decades, human rights actors have
questioned this separation in the course of examining the idea that
international economic actors should practice a form of social re-
sponsibility congruent with the body of law developed in the interna-
tional human rights system. Specifically, as human rights advocates
call into question transnational economic actors and international
economic institutions, and continue advancing methods to ensure
accountability of their economically-focused globalized counterparts,
the two communities come into contact, thus shaping a nexus.
Part I of this Article, by means of setting out a definition of inter-
national economic law used throughout the Article, discusses the
separation of private and public international law, as well as the dis-
tinctions between international business law and international eco-
nomic law. After giving a general view of each of these domains, it fo-
cuses more specifically on the institutions and actors in the
international economic demesne. Part II examines the points of con-
tact between the international economic and human rights communi-
ties. Particularly, it considers the innovations developed by the two
communities to introduce human rights into the market's space,
through negotiations and advocacy with transnational corporations
(TNCs), and the major international financial institutions: the IMF,
World Bank and WTO.
Part III focuses on the professional languages employed in the
discourse between the economic and human rights communities.
Specifically, it illustrates that the interaction between an economic
language and a rights-based language affects both the substance of
the discourse and the outcome of the interactions between these two
communities. Part III further argues that the protracted interaction
and negotiation between economic and human rights advocates cre-
ates an alter-language. Although this alter-language facilitates com-
7 See, e.g., Noberto Bobbio, The Great Dichotomy: Public/Private, in DEMOCRACY & DICTA-
TMRSuIP: THE NA-TRE AND LIMITS OF STATE POWER 2 (Peter Kennealy, trans.); INT'L ASS'N
OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS, LAW IN TilE SERVICE OF PEACE: Two CONCEPTS 39, 45(1963);
David Kennedy, Receiving the International, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (1994); Robert
Howse & Makau Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges for the World
Trade Organization 3 (2000), at http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/
globalization//wtoRightsGlob.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2002); see also Morton J. Horwitz,
The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1424 (1982) (noting
how the public/private distinction was brought into the core of legal discussion by the
evolution of the market as the central legitimating institution).
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munication, it may result in excessive compromises by rights advo-
cates. Analogizing to historical linguistic patterns of colonization, Part
III describes the potential dangers of language concessions. It rec-
ommends a conscious delineation of boundaries for human rights
advocates who are in constant interaction with the transnational eco-
nomic order. This ensures that they do not compromise substance nor
dilute basic human rights principles through language concessions
and modifications in the process of negotiations with the interna-
tional economic community. The Article concludes that, in order to
protect a wide range of potential alternatives for the attainment of
human dignity, individuals participating in this discourse must con-
sciously aim to retain the powerful utopian ideas couched in human
rights rhetoric.
I. THE MARKET'S PLACE
A. Nothing Is Private: A Definition of International Economic Law
This Article uses a broad definition of international economic
law, which includes public international law, international business
law, international trade law, private international law, and other cate-
gories that influence transnational economic activity and have the po-
tential to impact the advancement and protection of human rights.8
8 A good example of this broad definition of international economic law is provided
byJoel R. Paul:
In its broadest sense, international economic law includes all national and in-
ternational legal norms that affect transnational movements of goods, serv-
ices, capital and labor. The field may include subjects like international busi-
ness transactions, private international law, international trade law,
immigration law, European Communities law, comparative law, transnational
litigation, international arbitration procedure, and aspects of banking, com-
petition, employment, environmental, intellectual property, securities, tax,
and telecommunications laws that regulate transnational transactions.
Joel R. Paul, The New Movements in InternationalEconomic Law, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
607, 609 n.9 (1995). Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Foreignt Relations Law defines Inter-
national Economic Law as "all the international law and international agreements govern-
ing economic transactions that cross state boundaries or otherwise have implications for
more than one state, such as those involving movement of goods, funds, persons, intangi-
bles, technology, vessels or aircraft." RESTATEMENT (Trin) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
Part VIII, Introductory Note at 261 (1987). There is continued debate, however, over
which components of international law make up this term. Joel P. Trachtman describes
this debate by delineating arguments for a distinction between international business law
and international economic law. Under this view, international business law would remain
[Vol. 23:57
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The idea that international law is divided into two distinct realms-
private and public-is widely accepted though highly debated.9 Public
international law is traditionally referred to as the law governing rela-
tions between nation-states.10 Public law, though, has commonly been
defined as the law "dealing with the relations between private indi-
viduals and the government, and with the structure and operation of
outside of the scope of public international law while international economic law would be
included within it:
A related purported distinction between international business law and in-
ternational economic law is the distinction between transactions and trade.
Transactions, in this sense, are between private persons (or public persons
treated more or less as private persons), while trade is a matter of public pol-
icy and mercantilism or protectionism. The distinction is one between levels
of analysis. Analysis at the individual or firm level of economic organization is
transactional, while analysis at the state or higher level is economic. Because
the substantive body of law governing the individual is still predominantly
domestic, this distinction implicates the domestic-international dichotomy.
Joel P. Trachtman, Introduction: The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 33, 38 (1996). These debates use the definition of economic law as a battle-
ground for the debate over what economic activity should be included within the realms of
public versus private international law. The disagreement reveals that in order to address
all facets of economic activity, a definition of economic law similar to Joel Paul's and the
Restatement (Third) of Foreigni Relations Law is necessary since the definition Trachtman illus-
trates merely masks and reiterates the private/public distinction.
9 See Bobbio, supra note 7, at 7, 15-17; Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1349-57 (1982); Trachtman, supra note
8, at 34. For example, Joel Trachtman, in commenting on this debate, critiques the
definition of private international law as follows:
I note the emptiness of the category "private international law." Private inter-
national law is not separate from public international law. As many realists
and critical legal theorists long ago pointed out, "private law" is an oxymoron.
Rather, the important underlying issue is that there are at least two kinds of
persons subject to law: private persons and states. The two types of applicable
law may be quite different.
Trachtman, supra note 8, at 34. Another exception should be noted. The Secretariat of the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the Subcommission for the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights (formerly the Subcommission for the Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities) asserts that all international law is public inter-
national law. This body insists that any legal instrument, private or public, that involves
more than one state is a matter of public concern and is therefore a matter of public in-
ternational law. Telephone Interview with Tamara Kunanayakam, Human Rights Commis-
sion Secretariat, United Nations, (Aug. 1996) (on file with author). Ms. Kunanayakam is
currently directing the Working Group on Forced and Involuntary Disappearances under
the auspices of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in
Geneva, Switzerland.
10 Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 45 (3d ed.,
1993).
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the government itself."'' Private international law, on the other hand,
refers to resolutions for conflicts of law and establishes the principle
of comity for a country's domestic laws in foreign courts. 12 It is princi-
pally concerned with resolving conflicts of national law governing
transactions between individuals, associations, and corporations from
more than one domestic jurisdiction.'3
Under a globalizing order that erodes national sovereignty and
increases the importance of private actors, a clear delineation be-
tween private and public law and their relationship to one another is
difficult to discern. 14 As such, the boundaries between public and pri-
vate international law remain mutable. The increased role of cross-
border transactions, trade, and production has given greater impor-
tance to the economic activities of private actors' parastatal activity.' 5
As a result, an inclusive definition of international economic law is
necessary to discuss the interaction between the international eco-
nomic and international human rights regimes. Specifically, this in-
clusive definition allows for a consideration of all the points at which
international human rights and international economic law interact.
Adopting such a definition also permits a discussion of the impacts of
transnational economic activity on universal observance of human
rights without requiring a distinction between the public and the pri-
vate.
B. Objects of Criticism and Locations for Negotiations: Economic
Institutions and Transnational Corporations
Incorporated within the definition of international economic law
are the range of international economic instruments and institutions
established at the end of World War II to facilitate a stable and global-
ized liberal economic order. 6 International agreements dominate this
I1 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1244 (7th ed. 1999).
12 "Justice Story coined the term, 'private international law,' to describe the principles
governing conflicts which he derived from the law of nations." Patti, supra note 8, at 610.
IS Id.; Trachtman, supra note 8, at 40.
14 For example, in Economic Order and International Law, Wilhelm Ropke elaborated on
what he called "[t]he converging interest of the science of international law and of eco-
nomics in the connection between economic order and international law." Wilhelm
Ropke, Economic Order and International Law, 86 RECUEIL DES COURs 203, 212 (1954).
15 Paul, supra note 8, at 612-13.
16 This range of instruments and institutions emerged from the United States' and
British desire to stem the economic disorder that resulted from the departure of the pre-
World War I gold standard-based monetary system, the ensuing nationalist economic poli-
cies, and the ill-effects of the Great Depression. HENKIN ET AL.. supra note 10, at 1417-18.
[Vol. 23:57
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area and generally cover broad tracts such as international trade, in-
ternational monetary affairs, and international investment.17 A skele-
tal overview of the primary participants in international economic law
is essential for understanding the complexity of the debate that sur-
rounds regulation of transnational economic activity. Transnational
Corporations and the central international economic institutions are
among the locations at which transnational activity has been and can
continue to be influenced by human rights efforts, which demand
that such economic activity incorporate the basic rights of people.
At the center of modern international economic legal history is
the Bretton Woods-GATF system. Named after the 1944 conference
held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 18 this international eco-
nomic system arose from the twin goals of stabilizing exchange rates
in the post war period and ensuring the availability of the long-term
capital necessary for post World War II reconstruction.1 9 The Bretton
Woods Conference developed the framework for the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (the World Bank), and sketched the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)-World Trade Organization
(WTO) system.
Initial plans for both the World Bank and the IMF were focused
on reconstruction rather than on development.20 Advocates from less
developed nations, however, pushed for a rapid transition from re-
construction to development. They feared that, instead of financing
development in underdeveloped countries, institutions like the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development would merely
supplement private investors.2 1
17 Id. at 1394.
18 Some 730 people from forty-four countries-mostly allied nations-attended the
conference. Victor L. Urquidi, Reconstruction vs. Development: The IAF and the World Bank, in
BRETION WOODS, supra note 28, at 13.
19 Id. at 4.
20 Id. at 38-40.
21 Victor L. Urquidi of Mexico, one such advocate, recalled a talk he gave at the Lit-
tauer School at Harvard University in 1944.
I began by reminding the audience that... Latin America ... was well within
the lowest category of income.., per head in the world, productivity was low,
and we showed every feature of underdevelopment. We needed to raise farm
productivity and widen our domestic markets as a basis for industrialization,
for which we required "investment for development purposes, better tech-
nique, and more education." I saw all this as an argument for obtaining for-
eign assistance.... I did not see private investment alone as doing the job,
given the need for social reforms .... I feared that, unfortunately, the Bank
20031
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During the period from 1950 to the 1970s, the World Bank estab-
lished the International Development Association (IDA), the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation (IFC), and the training-focused Develop-
ment Institute.22 In addition, the World Bank embarked upon
research on various issues including agriculture, education, health,
and urban growth.23 The World Bank remained outwardly focused on
the project of reconstruction throughout these early years. By the
1970s, however, the World Bank underwent an institutional shift to-
wards development by expanding operations and giving substantial
support to development programs and plans in a number of countries
in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. 24
During the first decade of the World Bank's institutional shift,
the IMF remained closed to development issues, holding the position
that it was established essentially for the purpose of reconstruction. 25
From 1979 to 1985, however, the IMF also underwent an institutional
shift towards development. It became intensely involved in providing
loans and designing programs to carry developing country members
out of debt incurred from increases in oil prices and interest rates in
the early and mid 1970s.26 Presently, the IMF continues to act in a va-
riety of capacities, including monitoring and controlling the eco-
nomic management of a number of less developed nations. 27
The current international trade law regime originated in con-
junction with, though separate from, the Bretton Woods system. In
the winter of 1947-1948, the United Nations Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) organized the U.N. Conference on Trade and
for Reconstruction and Development (I actually said that "one almost forgets
to add this word") would place "too little emphasis on development" and that
its operations "would be mostly to supplement private investors ... instead of
lending its own money," whereas we were "by no means sure of being able to
resort to private capital on reasonable terms"; among other things, "investors
... will be after profits, or lower corporation taxes, but [would not be] inter-
ested in our organic development or industrialization as a whole."
Id. at 43.
22 Id.
23 Urquidi, supra note 18, at 47.
24 Id.
25 The goals of the IMF are set out in Article I of its Articles of Agreement. Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, as amended, Apr. 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203,
T.I.A.S. No. 8937.
26 HENKIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1419.
27 Irving S. Friedman, The International Monetary Fund: A Founder's Evaluation, in THE
POLrICAL MORALrY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 19 (RobertJ. Meyers ed.,
1987).
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Employment in Havana, Cuba.28 This conference originated in re-
sponse to a number of proposals for a United Nations conference to
negotiate an international trade charter and establish an Interna-
tional Trade Organization. By the spring of 1948, the conference par-
ticipants established the GATF and a Charter for the International
Trade Organization (ITO).29 Though the ITO was never accepted by
the United States and ultimately failed internationally, many of its
provisions were incorporated into the GATT articles soon after the
Havana Conference.30 The historical ITO provisions later became the
foundation for the World Trade Organization (WTO).3I
In addition to the GATT, other major regional instruments pro-
mote the advancement of free trade agreements, either among their
member nations or between member and non-member states. These
instruments include the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA),32 the European Economic Community,33 the African Eco-
nomic Community,3 4 the Latin American regional organizations, 35 the
28 HENKIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1396; Simon Reisman, The Birth of a World Trading
System: ITO and GATT, in THIE BRETrON WOODs-GATT SYSTEM: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
AFTER FIFTY YEARS 83-85 (Orin Kirshner ed., 1996) [hereinafter BRETrON WOODS].
2 Reisman, supra note 28, at 85.
30 Id. at 85-86.
31 Id. at 86.
32 Henkin et al. describe the history of the NAFTA as follows:
In March, 1985, President Reagan and [Canadian] Prime Minister Mul-
roney asked their trade officials to explore ways to eliminate barriers to trade
and investment between the United States and Canada. Under Congression-
ally granted "fast track" authority, negotiations began in 1986. The United
States and Canada reached an agreement on the framework of a free trade
area in 1987. And on January 1, 1989, the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement came into effect. 27 I.L.M. 293 (1988) .... The favorable recep-
tion ... moved the member states to open negotiations with Mexico with the
aim of bringing about a North American Free Trade Agreement. These nego-
tiations led to a signing of an agreement with Mexico at the end of 1992.
HENKIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1547.
33 For an overview of the history of the European Economic Community and a com-
parison between it and the NAFTA, see John P. Fitzpatrick, The Future of the North American
Free Trade Agreement: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of Regional Economic Institutions and the
Harmonization of Law in North America and Western Europe, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 10-23
(1996).
34 See generally Theophilus Fuseini Maranga, The Colonial Legacy and the African Common
Market: Problems and Challenges Facing the African Economic Community 10 HARV. BLACKLET-
TEa L.J. 105 (1993) (discussing the past and present challenges to the African Economic
Community as a result of the lingering effects of colonialism).
35 These include the Caribbean Community, the Andean Pact Organization, the Latin
American Integration Association, and the Latin American Free Trade Association and
MERCOSUR.
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Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) ,36 and the proposed
Arab Economic Union.3 7 In addition, a large network of bilateral in-
vestment treaties complicate this regional system of economic agree-
ments. These treaties include bilateral investment guarantee agree-
ments; bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation; and
bilateral investment treaties for the encouragement and protection of
foreign investment.38
Transnational corporations seek and enjoy the stability and pro-
tection provided by these economic institutions and agreements.
Though largely unregulated by international law, transnational cor-
36 See generally Lim Siong Hoon, Asean Takes First Step to Regional Customs Grouping, FIN.
TIMES (London), Oct. 9, 1991, at 3 (reporting that in October 1991, the member countries
of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) announced their creation of an
Asian Free Trade Area, consisting of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singa-
pore, and Thailand, with the objective of creating a single market within 15 years); Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations web site, at http://www.asean.org (last visited Oct. 2, 2002)
(offering up-to-date information about the status and progress of ASEAN negotiations and
legal documents).
37 An International Conference to Study Arab Economic Union, ARABIcNEWS.COM, (Novem-
ber 20, 1997) 2, at http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/971120/1997112024.
html (last visited Oct. 2, 2002); see also Mosad Zineldin, Globalisation and Economic Integra-
tion AmongArab Countries, 5, at http://www.hf.uib.no/smi/pao/zineldin.htmi (last visited
Oct. 2, 2002).
3 HENNtN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1394-95. By 1994 developed countries had negoti-
ated over 500 bilateral investment treaties with developing countries. A.A. Fatouros, To-
wards an International Agreement on Foreign Direct Investment, in ORGANIZATION FOR Eco-
NOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TOWARDS MULFI'LATERAL INVESTMENT RULES 50
(1996). Of the over 1,100 treaties listed in a 1999 publication by the World Bank Group's
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, more than 800 had been con-
cluded since 1987 and the list of countries party to such treaties had grown to 155. INT'L
CENTRE FOR SETILEMENr OF INv. DispUms, Introduction to Bilateral Investment Treaties, at
http://www.worldbak.org/icsid/treaties/intro.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002). In May
1995, the complexity of this web of instruments led the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) to conduct negotiations among OECD member
states for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). The MAI's goal was to "provide a
broad multilateral framework for international investment with high standards for the
liberalization of investment regimes and investment protection and with effective dispute
settlement procedures." ...... "After a three-year period of intense and highly contested
negotiations, lasting until May 1998, and a six-month pause during which no official meet-
ings on the MAI took place, negotiations ceased in December 1998." OECD FINANCIAL,
FISCAL, AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Docu mentation from the
Negotiation, at http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/mai/intro.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2002).
For a good introduction to the problem of developing a code of conduct for compa-
nies, see UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGIITS, PRINCIPLES RELATING TO TILE HUMAN RIGHTS CONDUCT OF COMPANIES, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/WG.2/WP.1/ (2000); see also HENKIN ET AL., supra note 10, at
96 (stating that general multinational treaties lay down rules of behavior that are of a
"fundamentally norm-creating character" that form the basis for a general rule of law).
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porations have become important players in the international eco-
nomic system as foreign direct investment continues to increase rap-
idly and transnational corporations grow in number and size.
Added to the plethora of international institutions and entities
that are potential objects of criticism and locations for negotiation are
nation-states. The nation-state retains the power to regulate and de-
regulate the actions of people and corporate entities within its bor-
ders. Multinational agreements remain dependent on the approval of
nations for legitimacy. If democratic, national governments also hold
the burden of accountability to their citizens. As the purported repre-
sentative of the people, a national government is an obvious recipient
of criticism when it negotiates contracts with investors or treaties with
foreign nations that are contrary to the well being of its populous. 39
Given this complex consortium of economic actors, it is little
wonder that it has been an arduous task to define the goals of regulat-
ing transnational economic activity to ensure that it does not violate
the basic rights of people. The following section provides an historical
overview of the attempts to ensure the observance of human rights by
transnational economic actors.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ENCONOMIC LAW:
ENCOUNTERS
The negotiations between the human rights community and its
international economic counterparts have been in progress, in differ-
ing degrees and with diverging levels of success, for over thirty years.
To illustrate the importance of the language developing from those
negotiations, Part II first discusses the role of nongovernmental or-
ganizations in the interactions between the human rights community
and the international economic community. Section B then traces the
developments of the negotiations between the human rights commu-
nity and TNCs by means of various codes of conduct. Last, Section C
outlines the general trend of the major international financial institu-
tions towards acknowledging, at least in part, the influence and im-
s The debate surrounding NAFTA is a good example of opposition to an interna-
tional trade treaty from large portions of a population. See, e.g., Harry Browne, Green
Groups, Maturing Relationships, 5 BORDERLINES 31, 1[ 1, available at http://www.us-mex.org/
borderlines/1997/b131/bl3lgren.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2002). For example, there has
been Canadian opposition to NAFTA. See Iryll Umel, Capital Watch: NAFTA's Drain on Ca-
nadian Sovereignty, WASHINGTON REPORT ON THE HEMISPHERE 5 (Aug. 6, 2001) at
http://www.coha.org/WRH_issues/21.14-CW-Nafta.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2002).
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pact of their institutions on the protection and promotion of the
ideas encompassed by international human rights.
A. The Voice of Human Rights: The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are prominent and es-
sential actors in the efforts to ensure the accountability of transna-
tional economic activity. These groups actively, and at times noisily,
link this economic activity with the observance of human rights. To-
gether with the United Nations and the ILO, they are the primary ad-
vocates and protectors of human rights law and ideas. NGOs have
contributed tremendously to efforts to draw the attention of interna-
tional economic actors to the compelling nature of human rights and
their integral importance in long-term, sustainable development. In
consulting and negotiating with their economic counterparts, how-
ever, it is essential that NGOs remain attentive at all times to the
specific substantive and linguistic concessions they agree to make with
economic actors.
Traditionally, NGOs play a gadfly role by calling attention to abu-
sive labor practices, 40 environmental offenses,41 and the marketing of
products that are known health-hazards. 42 Until the late 1990s, how-
ever, human rights NGOs had done little to highlight the need to
precondition the expansion of transnational economic activity with
both corporate observance of basic human rights and a commitment
by all countries active in the global economy to improve their human
rights records. The 1997 Human Rights Watch World Report was the
first indication that Human Rights Watch acknowledged transnational
economic activity as a threat to human rights. 43 In its 1998 report,
40 See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, LATIN AMERICA: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLA-
TIONS AGAINST TRADE UNIONISTS 1-5 (1991); AMNES'I IN'IERNATIONAL USA, PHILIP-
PINES: HUMAN RIGHTIS VIOLATIONS AND TilE LABOUR MOVEMENT 1-3 (1991).
U1 See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 01-7756L, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 16540, at *1
(2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2002). See discussion infra note 88.
42 See generally LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGIITS & NAT'L RES. DEF. COUNCIL,
WORKING PAPER: AN INT'L FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS POSED BY INT'L
TRADE IN BANNED OR SEVERELY RESTRICTED PROD. (1983) (arguing that importing nations
must give informed consent before they allow banned or severely restricted products to
enter their territory and concluding that the United Nations must establish a framework
that would allow every nation to protect its citizenry by mandating such informed consent
regulations).
48 HUMAN RIGIVS WATCII, HUMAN RIGIHTS WATiCH WORLD REPORT 1997: EVENTS OF
1996, at 356-61 (1996) (including an overview of 1996 activist efforts to encourage corpo-
rations to observe labor rights, environmental rights, rights of association and providing
cursory information on the role of governments in balancing the promotion of human
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Human Rights Watch noted the emerging importance of NGO activity
in promoting corporate practices that comply with universal human
rights standards.44 By 2001, Human Rights Watch had created a de-
partment on Corporations and Human Rights, included a section on
Business and Human Rights in its annual report, and employed full
time staff on this issue. 45
Another NGO, the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights, first
began to focus on the relationship between international financial
institutions and the advancement of human rights in 1993.46 Differing
from many other NGOs, which targeted transnational corporations,
the Lawyers Committee focused on the responsibility of the World
Bank in the promotion of human rights. 47 Partially as a result of this
work and the work of other NGOs surrounding the activity of multi-
lateral economic institutions, the World Bank now considers how the
projects it funds will effect human rights.48
The proliferation of NGO activity on the issue of human rights
and trade or human rights and business is impressive. As general fa-
miliarity with this issue has spread and deepened, so the NGOs work-
ing on this issue have mirrored that growth. The challenge ahead is to
ensure that these groups, while advocating for inclusion of human
rights concerns, maintain the strong language of rights within their
institutional rhetoric.
rights with the desire to attract capital investment). Notably this human rights issue, which
just the year before had been relegated to the back of this organization's annual report,
appeared near the front of its 1998 report. In the 1998 report, "Multinational Corpora-
tions" appeared as the third campaign issue after landmines and the establishment of an
International Criminal Court. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCtH, HUMAN RIGIIrs WATCH WORLD
REPORT 1998: EVENTS Or 1997, at 415-22 (1997) [hereinafter WORLD REPORT 1998] (listing
"Corporations and Human Rights" as the second special issue after "Prisons").
44 Id.
45 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2002: EVENTS
OF 2001, at 564-73 (2002) [hereinafter WORLD REPORT 2002].
46 Their first publication on this matter was THE LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, THE WORLD BANK: GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGIITS (1993).
47 LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IN THE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT: HUMAN
RIGHTS AND TIlE WORLD BANK IN INDONESIA, AJOINT REPORT OF THE LAWYERS COMMIT-
TEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND TIE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY RESEARCH AND ADVOCACY 1
(1995) [hereinafter IN TIlE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT]. Subsequent reports of the Lawyer's
Committee for Human Rights are also committed to this goal.
48 Attention from the World Bank and other international financial institutions to
human rights will be discussed in Part II, Section C.
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B. Regulating Business Conduct in the Global Economic System:
Codes of Conduct
Nongovernmental organizations have had varying degrees of
success in interacting with the range of international economic actors
discussed herein. NGOs, together with the United Nations, the ILO,
and individual governments, have found codes of conduct to be a
successfil means to influence the activities of TNCs. This section de-
tails the differing types of codes of conduct, each with their own set of
methods and goals, and each with their own potential for effective
inclusion of human rights within corporations' daily activities. Almost
all codes of conduct remain entirely voluntary and lack enforcement
mechanisms. This, among other reasons, may explain the ready in-
corporation of the optimistic language of human rights by many
TNCs. Nonetheless, they provide a model for maintaining human
rights language at other points of contact between the human rights
community and its economic counterparts.
1. International Institutional Initiatives to Promulgate Codes
In response to the mobilization efforts of human rights NGOs,
the United Nations and its individual members have focused on regu-
lating the behavior of non-state actors.49 Private corporations, particu-
larly TNCs, are included within this focus, as they are "some of the
most significant non-state actors in the world today."50 As a result, the
United Nations (U.N.) and other inter-governmental bodies advocate
developing transnational codes of conduct for TNCs. 51
The United Nations' attempts to create a code of conduct for
TNCs are varied and numerous. In 1990 the United Nations Centre
on Transnational Corporations issued a Draft Code of Conduct for
TNCs. 52 Although the Commission on Transnational Corporations
49 Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations in the
Protection of International Human Rights, 6 MINN.J. GLOBAL TRADE 153, 158 (1997).
50 Id.
51 Id.
- 52 Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Center on
Transnational Corporations, Special Sess. (Mar. 7-18, 1983 and May 9-20, 1983), U.N.
Doc. E/C.10/1982/6 (1986) [hereinafter Draft Code]; Draft United Nations Code of Conduct
on Transnational Corporations, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. Transnational Corporations, Special
Sess. (June 11-29, 1984), U.N. Doc. E/C.10/1984/s/5 (1984). The mandate to issue this
Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations was prompted by three factors. First,
international economic law scholars held that host countries should abide by certain stan-
dards concerning treatment of foreign investors. They believed such standards should be
enforced at the international level. Second, a widespread demand for some sort of interna-
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agreed on the Draft Code of Conduct, the U.N. member states were
unable to agree on key provisions "dealing with protection of prop-
erty and contractual rights, compensation in case of taking property,
and the settlement of disputes."53 Consequently, the Draft Code of
Conduct was abandoned.5 4 In 1996 the United Nations Human Rights.
Commission established a Working Group on the Right to Develop-
ment that re-initiated U.N. activity aimed at establishing a framework
to hold accountable TNCs that violate human rights standards.55
In 1998 the Subcommission for Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities (now the Subcommission for the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights) established the Sessional Working
Group on the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational Cor-
tional standards of behavior emerged from both concerns that TNCs were interfering with
the traditional social and cultural objectives of their host countries and evidence of corpo-
rate misconduct, corruption, and interference in internal state matters. Third, rights ad-
vocates and international economic actors alike believed a Code of Conduct was necessary
in order to assure uniformity, predictability, and accountability. Outstanding Issues in the
Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Transna-
tional Corporations, Special Sess. (June 17-21, 1985), at 6-7, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/1985/s/2
(1985).
53 Gillian White, The New International Economic Order: Principles and Terms, in INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMic LAW AND DEVELOPING STATES 48-49 (Hazel Fox ed., 1992) [hereinafter
DEVELOPING STATES].
54 There is general consensus that there will not be further negotiations on the Draft
Code. See id. at 49; HENKIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1458. In fact, the Centre on Transna-
tional Corporations no longer exists as an autonomous entity and has been made one part
of the Transnational Corporations and Management Division of the Division of Economic
and Social Development of ECOSOC. During the period in which the Centre on Transna-
tional Corporations drafted the Code of Conduct, it had been an autonomous body within
the U.N. Secretariat. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1454, 1458-59. Importantly, the
Commission agreed on draft provisions on the recognition of state sovereignty, adherence
to the cultural and economic imperatives of the host country, and respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms. Draft Code, supra note 52, 6, 9, 12, 13.
55 This intergovernmental working group of experts had a two-year mandate for its
work. In 1998, under Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1998/72, the Commission
on Human Rights established an open-ended Working Group on the Right to Develop-
ment to "monitor and review progress made in the promotion and implementation of the
right to development as elaborated in the Declaration on the Right to Development." The
Right to Development, U.N. High Comm. Hum. Rts., Comm. Hum. Rts. Res. 1998/72, ES-
COR, Supp. No. 3, at 229, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES./1998/72 (1998). Numerous state-
ments of this body argue that the current concentration of economic and political power
in transnational corporations stands as an obstacle to the realization of the right to devel-
opment and to achieving equity in resource and income allocation. Declaration on the Right
to Development, G.A. Res. 128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/41/128 (1986); Report of the Working Group on the Right to Development on Its Second
Session, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. Hum. Rts., 51st Sess., 59, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/11;
Report of the Working Group on the Right to Development on Its First Session, U.N. ESCOR,
Comm. Hum. Rts., 50th Sess., 1 91, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/21.
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porations with the intention of evaluating the propriety of adopting a
code of conduct for TNCs.56 The Working Group's draft principles on
the conduct of corporations provide a basis for assessing corporations'
performance and have the potential to result in either a new U.N.
standard or global guidelines for the conduct of corporations. 57 In
August 2002, the mandate of this Working Group was extended until
2004, a clear indication of the Subcommission's continued interest in
the interaction between human rights and international corporate
activity.
In 2000 the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Anan,
announced the creation of the highly publicized Global Compact, an
initiative launched with the aim of encouraging corporations to vol-
untarily adopt nine fundamental principles on human rights, labor,
and environmental protections. 5 8 The Global Compact directly ap-
peals to private corporations to adopt and adhere to principles that
are already widely accepted by U.N. member states, via the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Labour Organiza-
tion's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
and the 1992 Rio Declaration of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development.59
The U.N. is not the only international institution to attempt to
adopt codes of conduct for TNCs. In 1976 the Organization for Eco-
56 The Relationship Between the Enjoyment of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the
Right to Development, and the Working Methods of Transnational Corporations, U.N. High Comm.
Hum. Rts., Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Res. 1998/8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1998/8 (1998).
57 Report of the Sessional Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of Transna-
tional Corporations on its Fourth Session, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. Hum. Rts., Sub-Commission
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 54th Sess., U.V. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/13 (2002); WORI.t REPORT 2002, supra note 45, at 571.
18 Secretary-General Proposes Global Compact on Human Rights, Labor, Environment
in Address to World Economic Forum in Davos, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6881/Rev.l* (1990) a-
vailable at http://www.un.org/partners/business/dav'os.htm (last visited Oct.2, 2002). Most
interesting about the Global Compact is the Secretary- General's suggestion to the private
actors that they have the power to encourage sovereign states over which they have
influence to adhere to the principles of the Global Compact. He also encourages these
private actors to behave in accordance with the Global Compact, even in locations that
may not afford these protections to their own people. Id.
59 See The Global Compact, Overview, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
Portal / (last visited Nov. 8, 2002). The overview states that the Global Compact is "based
on nine principles in the areas of human rights, labour, and the environment." These prin-
ciples are "derived from universal consensus based on" the Universal Declaration of Hu-
manl Rights, The International Labour Organization's (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, and The Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment.
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nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states
adopted a Declaration on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises.6° When the Guidelines were adopted in 1976, they repre-
sented the first international agreement on multinational enterprises
accepted by both business and labor representatives of the OECD
member states. As such, they represent an innovative approach to en-
couraging responsible behavior from multinational enterprises. 61
Likewise, the International Labor Organization adopted a code
of conduct for TNCs. 62 Entitled "Tripartite Declaration of Principles
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy," the tripar-
tite ILO system requires that the Conference delegation from each
state party be comprised of two governed representatives, one labor
60 OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, in THE
OECD DECLARATION AND DECISIONS ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISES: BASIC TEX'S, 5-6 (Nov. 8, 2000), available at http://www.olis.
oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/c5ce8ffa4l835d64cl 25685d005300b0/cl 25692700623b74cl 25
6991003b5147/$FILE/00085743.PDF (last visited Oct. 2, 2002). [hereinafter OECD DEC-
LARAION]. In Annex I to that document the member states also adopted Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises. OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, in
OECD DECLARATION supra. at 7-10 [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. These Guidelines "aim
to ensure that the operations of [multinational] enterprises are in harmony with govern-
ment policies to strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between enterprises and the
societies in which they operate .... " Id. at 7. The Guidelines include provisions on "Em-
ployment and Industrial Relations" and "Environment." Id. at 13-16.
61 At least one proponent of codes, guidelines, and declarations argues that these non-
binding instruments can influence the behavior of governments and enterprises. See Wil-
liam C. Fredrick, The Moral Authority of Transnational Corporate Codes, 10 J. OF Bus. E'rHtcs,
165, 167 (1991). It is arguable that the Guidelines provide a valuable reference for future
endeavors of the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations and the efforts of
the International Labour Organization (ILO) to draft similar documents. (The ILO
document will be discussed below.) The Guidelines are largely ineffectual, however. First,
upon learning that the environmental provisions of the Guidelines were adopted in 1991,
one may optimistically argue that such a recent addition to the Guidelines indicates that
they could be modified again to include provisions ensuring that international human
rights standards are observed by multinational enterprises. OECD Guidelines, supra note 60.
Although the guidelines were recently clarified, they are unlikely be modified in the near
future. Second, the Guidelines are voluntary, and there is no indication that OECD mem-
ber-states intend to make corporate or investor adherence to the Guidelines a precondi-
tion of operating within their territory. In fact, this would probably be an express violation
of current Guideline provisions, which are explicitly intended to be voluntary. Id. at 7.
Finally, a 1991 decision of the OECD Council clarifies that, in addition to being voluntary,
the Guidelines are non-enforceable, even against enterprises that commit to observing
them. Id. at 33-34.
62 Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and So-
cial Policy was adopted by the ILO on November 16, 1977, at the 204th Session of the ILO
in Geneva. International Labor Organization Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Mul-
tinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 17 I.L.M. 422 (Nov. 16, 1977).
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representative, and one representative from the business sector.63
Though each government chooses its representatives in consultation
with the country's business community, the employer and the labor
representatives are theoretically free to take positions that do not con-
form to their government's policy objectives. 64
2. National Campaigns to Establish Codes of Conduct: The Model of
the United States
National governments also encourage codes of conduct. The
United States government, for example, now encourages United
States-based corporations to adopt codes of conduct to regulate their
own activity when they establish operations in foreign countries or
contract with foreign suppliers and producers. 65 These types of codes
aim to regulate corporate activity, as opposed to codes that aim to
influence the human rights practices of the countries where TNCs are
active. Codes that aim to influence corporations' human rights prac-
tices propose that businesses interested in countries with poor human
rights records have a responsibility to act as agents for the protection
and promotion of human rights in the course of their conduct.66 This
type of proposal has emerged as the countries that once advocated for
transnational corporate accountability have become increasingly con-
vinced that development is their primary priority.
In an atmosphere in which countries view themselves in competi-
tion for capital activity,67 many in the human rights conununity have
63 Jonathan 1. Charney, Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International
Law, 1983 DUKE L.J. 748, 778 n.74.64 Id.
6 Douglass Cassel, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution, 19 FORDULAM
INT'L L.J. 1963, 1974 (1996). For example, in 1996 the United States Department of
Commerce issued Model Business Principles. In addition, other campaigns for codes of
conduct include the No Sweat Campaign launched in 1996 by U.S. Labor Secretary Robert
Reich; the "Trendsetter" list started by the Labor Department to encourage retailers to
demonstrate a commitment to U.S. labor laws; and the Apparel Industry Partnership,
which was also facilitated by the Labor Department. Deborah L. Spar, The Spotlight and the
Bottom Line: How Multinationals Export Human Rights, 77 FOREIGN AtFAIRS 7, 7-8 (Mar./Apr.
1998).
66 Business leaders who reject suggestions that they should be human rights reformers
usually defend their positions by insisting that democracy and human rights are promoted
by free trade rather than regulation of corporate conduct. See Frey, supra note 49, at n.13.
67 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 38, at
9. But see PAUL KRUGMAN, PoP IN-TERNATIONALISM 6 (1997). KIugman argues that the be-
lief that one country must compete with all the others as though in a global marketplace
in order to attract foreign direct investment is flawed. He states:
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begun arguing that TNCs should act as advocates for human rights in
the host countries in which they operate.6 It may be possible for the
United States to prohibit corporations from violating human rights or
locating in countries that violate human rights in accordance with the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 414
comment c. 69 According to the Restatement, subject to certain restric-
tions, "a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ....
(1) (c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have
substantial effect within its territory, [and] (2) the activities, interests,
status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its terri-
tory,"70 except where such jurisdiction is unreasonable. 71 More
specifically, the Restatement explains that a State may prescribe its laws
extraterritorially "for limited purposes with respect to activities of for-
eign branches of corporations organized under its laws." 72
A comment to the Restatement seeks to limit permissible extrater-
ritorial regulation by stating that, as a general matter, such laws may
not be prescribed extraterritorially if they will apply to "predominately
local activities, such as industrial and labor relations, health and safety
practices, or conduct related to preservation or control of the local
environment."73 This comment appears to prohibit extraterritorial
application of laws on a wide range of human rights matters. One
commentator has noted, however, that although bribery-the subject
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-may be classified as a local ac-
tivity, "the United States' criminalization of bribery abroad may be
distinguished from the activities listed in Comment c of the Third Re-
statement by the fact that bribery is a simple negative proscription ('do
not bribe'), whereas the other activities involve extensive positive
In fact, however, trying to define the competitiveness of a nation is much
more problematic than defining that of a corporation. The bottom line for a
corporation is literally the bottom line .... Countries, on the other hand, do
not go out of business. They may be happy or unhappy with their economic
performance, but they have no well-defined bottom line. As a result, the con-
cept of national competitiveness is elusive.
Id.
68 See, e.g., Cassel, supra note 65.
69 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TE UNITED STATES
§ 402(1), (2) (1987).
70 According to the Restatement, a TNC is considered a national of the state tnder
whose law it is organized or incorporated. Id. at cmt. e.
71Id. at § 403(1).
721d. at § 414(1).
731d. at cmt. c.
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regulations." 74 Therefore if negative proscriptions are permissible, a
law could be enacted which simply prohibits corporations from violat-
ing basic human rights or locating in countries that violate the human
rights treaties of that corporation's home state.
The United States government has often used its ability to regu-
late transnational economic activity as a method of encouraging for-
eign governments to comply with basic human rights standards. An-
other method employed by the United States and other nations is the
use of economic sanctions and embargoes against countries that have
fallen into disfavor with the U.S. 75 The most successful and well-
known example is the United States embargo on trade with and in-
vestment in South Africa during the final years of apartheid in that
country.76 U.S. use of economic embargoes, however, has recently be-
come unpopular as a result of multilateral economic treaties that
prohibit such sanctions. 77
74 Joshua P. Eaton, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corpo-
rations, and the Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 261, 280 n.98
(1997).
75 Frey states:
Economic sanctions are a tool used to punish offending governments; these
sanctions have a direct impact on TNCs doing or seeking to do business in
these countries. The U.S. Government has sought to extend its influence
even further in the cases of Cuba, Iran, and Libya, by adopting legislation that
would penalize non-U.S. businesses that have certain types of investments in
these rogue states.
Frey, supra note 49, at 168-69 (citations omitted).
76 Daniel Schorr, What the World Thinks of "the Embargo, 'T IE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MON-
TOR,Jan. 23, 1998, at http://www.csmonitor.co/durable/1998/01/23/opin/cohlmnn.1.
html (last visited Nov. 8, 2002).
77 The GATT/WTO system asserts equal treatment of investors and countries in like
circumstances through Most Favored Nation (MFN) status as one of its fundamental prin-
ciples. The Most Favored Nation provision of the draft documents for the Multilateral
Agreement on Investments (MAI) provides one historical example of the international
move to eliminate economic embargoes. OECD, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(Report by the Chairman to the Negotiating Group), Annex 3 art. 2, 13-14 (May 1998), available
at http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng9817e.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2002). Ac-
cording to this provision, once a country grants a certain level of treatment to a foreign
investor or a foreign investment from a particular country, it cannot then grant less favor-
able treatment to any other investment or investor. This principle of the MAI also would
have required equal treatment among all target countries.
The Most Favored Nation provision of the MAI provides a valuable example of a gen-
eral decline in the use of economic or trade sanctions to discourage governments from
engaging in abusive practices. For a concise discussion of the decline of MFN status and
the rise of Normal Trade Relations status, see, for example, INTERNATIONAL TRADE DATA
Svs'TEM, NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS (FORMERLY KNOWN AS MOST FAVORED-NATLION STAlUS
(MFN)), at www.itds.treas.gov/mfn.html (last updated Mar. 12, 2002). This would prevent
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3. Private Initiatives to Establish Voluntary Codes of Conduct
Corporations themselves, under pressure from consumer boy-
cotts, have voluntarily developed and adopted codes of conduct. 78
There is some evidence that this is a successful strategy for ensuring
corporate adherence to human rights standards. For example, as a
result of public pressure, boycotts, or picketing, many large and well-
known corporations such as the Gap, Starbucks Coffee, and Reebok
have committed to much-improved labor standards and have agreed
to monitor the labor practices of their sourcing locations. 79
Nonetheless, consumer boycott strategies are an inefficient
method to achieve high levels of human rights observance. Consumer
boycotts are only likely to be successful against brand name products
that are both well known and conveniently replaceable by consumers.
The voluntary codes of conduct system assumes the brand-driven
market functions in such a manner that a consumer is actually willing
and able to replace a favorite brand by one that has not been cited for
human rights violations. Even promoters of the voluntary codes of
conduct system admit that observance of human rights issues "is not
filly decisive in the marketplace."80 Additionally, these strategies de-
pend on access to fill and accurate information on corporate activity
that is often extremely difficult to discern. 81
governments from distinguishing between foreign investors or foreign investment targets
based on countries' human rights practices, labor treatment, or other criteria. It should be
noted that by denying member states the ability to use economic sanctions and embargoes
against nations that violate human rights, a valuable method of enforcing human rights
may be eliminated. See HARVARD HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM, TIlE MULTILATERAL AGREE-
MENT ON INVESTMENT: A THREAT TO NINTRNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHrS PROTECTION
MECHANISMS (1998) (on file with author) (outlining the human rights norms that would
have been violated if the MAI had passed). Though not discussed at length herein, a re-
cent article by Barbara Frey provides a comprehensive overview of United States domestic
actions on regulating its own corporations that extend their business to foreign countries.
See Frey, supra note 49, at 168-73. These efforts include the codes of conduct initiated at
the federal level which have already been mentioned in this Article, as well as legislative
initiatives to regulate the economic activity of transnational enterprises and regulate the
involvement of United States' corporations in the political affairs of foreign nations. Id.
78 Examples include Social Accountability International's Social Accountability 8000
campaign, which aims to encourage firms to adhere to a predetermined set of labor and
human rights standards by providing them with certification as a SA8000 company if their
manufacturers pass inspection. SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INT'L, AN OVERVIEW OF SA AND
SA8000, at http://www.cepaa.org/introduction.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2002). The success
of this effort clearly depends on consumer awareness and activism.
79 See Spar, supra note 65, at 9-10.
80 Id. at 9.
81 For example, after the Nike Corporation adopted its Code of Conduct, it disap-
peared from the light of public scrutiny. However, the CEO of Nike has revealed that de-
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Further, it is misleading to assert that these codes of conduct are
likely to reverse current exploitative trends and actually create a "race
to the top."82 Although pressuring corporations to observe basic hut-
man rights standards may improve corporate observance of human
rights above the deplorable level which inspires consumer boycotts,
this is a much more modest advance than what one might imagine a
true race to the top would achieve.
Distinguished from codes of conduct regulating the corpora-
tion's own human rights practices are codes aiming to influence the
human rights records of the countries in which a corporation oper-
ates.83 In the first scenario, the best advocacy strategy may be to pro-
mote improvement of the domestic laws regulating corporate activity.
The international codes mentioned above and the idea of Most Fa-
vored Nation status prohibit differential treatment under the domes-
tic law of any given country between foreign and domestic companies.
This contributes greatly to what has become known as the "race to the
bottom." Business enterprises may not be breaking domestic law when
spite Nike's adoption of a Code of Conduct, which purportedly regulates labor practices of
all their foreign subsidiaries and producers, the company does not adhere to those prac-
tices. TlE BIG ONE (Miramax Pictures 1997). In addition, workers who produce Nike
products in Jakarta are entirely unaware that Nike has promulgated a Code of Conduct
and certainly have neither means of reporting accurately and efficiently on Nike's adher-
ence to this code, nor means to enforce it. Id.; see also What Would You Do If You and Seven
Other Workers at Your Factory Lost Fingers in Dangerous Machinery Because the Factory Owner
Couldn't Be Bothered to Fix It? Haryanto's Story (Jan. 2000), at
http://www.caa.org.au/campaigns/nike/haryanto.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2002).
8 See Spar, supra note 65, at 9-10. In this context, the race to the top suggests that
companies, in seeking consumer approval and loyalty, compete or race against one an-
other to protect and promote labor and human rights conditions for their workers or the
environmental conditions in the regions where they work.
m In 1990, in response to Chinese human rights abuses, Reebok announced the fol-
lowing principles:
1. Reebok will not operate tinder martial law conditions or allow any military
presence on its premises.
2. Reebok encourages free association and assembly among its employees.
3. Reebok will seek to ensure that opportunities for advancement are based
on initiative, leadership and contributions to the business, not political be-
liefs. Further, no one is to be dismissed from working at its factories for politi-
cal views or non-violent involvement.
4. Reebok will seek to prevent compulsory political indoctrination programs
from taking place on its premises.
5. Reebok reaffirms that it deplores the use of force against human rights.
Frey, supra note 49, at 180 n.140 (quoting Diane Orentlicher & Timothy Gelatt, Public Law,
Private Actors: The Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors in China, 14 Nw. J. INT'l. L. &
Bus. 66, 108 (1993)) (citing Reebok Code of Conduct).
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they benefit from a country's legal structure that is geared towards
maximizing profits but does not provide adequate environmental,
health, or labor protections. These enterprises often operate, how-
ever, in violation of the rights enumerated in the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 84 As a law-abiding
entity in a country that itself has not become a state party to the
Covenants or is not fulfilling its obligations under these Covenants,
such a corporation is shielded from accountability as long as it can
prove that it did not make any of the key decisions to violate human
rights in a country that has incorporated human rights laws into its
domestic legislation.8 At the same time, as long as the U.N. Subcom-
mission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and the
U.N. Human Rights Commission are reluctant to hold nations ac-
countable for failing to prosecute corporations that violate human
rights, the likelihood that these violations will escape international
scrutiny remains high.
Alternatively, a law could mandate that corporations, in the
course of conducting their activities abroad, provide the same level of
protection to human rights, such as labor and environmental rights,
as mandated in their home countries.86 Such laws might persuade the
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into forceJan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
8 See, e.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 01-7756L, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 16540, at *10
(2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2002). The plaintiffs in this case, seeking relief based on Texaco's alleged
environmental abuse in Equador, filed suit in part under the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ACTA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789), asserting that Texaco's actions violated international
law. Id. The plaintiffs legal team convinced the court that if it could prove that Texaco's
decision to pursue environmental degradation in Ecuador that, if conducted in the United
States would violate U.S. environmental law, Texaco could not use the procedural defense
of forum non conveniens to block the litigation against it. Id. In 2001, after six years of
rehearings and remands, the district court dismissed these actions based on forum non
conveniens, holding that litigation should proceed in Equador. Aguinda v. Texaco, 142 F.
Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd as modified, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 16540 (2d. Cir.
2002). In conducting its forum non conveniens analysis, the district court concluded that
plaintiffs would be unlikely to demonstrate that Texaco's acts were intentional torts ac-
tionable tunder the ATCA. Id. at 544. For further information on this and other cases filed
tinder the ATCA, see http://www.earthrights.org/litigation/index.html (last updated May
28, 2002).
86 For a proposal to extend all relevant U.S. environmental regulations to TNC opera-
tions abroad, see Alan Neff, Not in Their Backyards, Either: A Proposal for a Foreign Environ-
mental Practices Act, 17 EcOLOGY L.Q. 477 (1990); see also Mitchell F. Crusto, All That Glitters
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domestic corporations of a given country to improve their standards.
First, once TNCs are prevented from increasing profits by capitalizing
on human rights abuses, host-country domestic corporations-that
currently escape scrutiny-may become the targets of a consumer
boycott strategy. By analogy, the internationalization of the United
States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 87 suggests that if countries im-
pose obligations on their own corporations doing business abroad,
there could be a tendency to universalize the legal norm so as to re-
duce any competitive advantage of corporations not yet constrained
by such laws. In this instance it must be noted that, in large part, the
countries with the most powerful corporate interests carry tremen-
dous influence in the realm of international law and policy.
Mandating corporations to provide the same level of protection
to human rights as in their home countries could, however, place
western corporations at a disadvantage in the global market by allow-
ing corporations originating in nations without human rights protec-
tions to exploit their labor sources. Western corporations, however,
saddled with the protective laws of their home states, would be pro-
hibited from capitalizing in this way.ss The predictable result would be
a massive shift in location of original legal incorporation away from
developed nations into the jurisdictions with the lowest levels of hu-
man rights protection. This, in turn, would result in a rapid elimina-
tion of protective laws in the countries that currently do protect hu-
man rights in an attempt to encourage corporate headquarters to
repatriate. 89 Hence, another race to the bottom.90
Is Not Gold: Congressionally-Driven Global Environmental Policy, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.
499, 519-29 (1999).
87 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1994). See generally A Blow Against
Bribery: Michael Hershman on the OECD Campaign over Corruption, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb.
23, 1998, at 14.
88 Spar notes that it is difficult for competing companies to insist on superior labor
standards or pay higher wages due to the force of the market: "if one firm pays the higher
wage or refuses to do business with an exploitative low-cost sub-contractor, it risks losing
market share to more callous competitors." Spar, supra note 65, at 10.
89 This argument is perhaps most popularly known as the "giant sucking sound" that
Ross Perot, 1992 and 1996 presidential candidate, predicted the United States would hear
after NAFTA was signed. See, e.g., ThomasJ. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection
of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AJIL. 268, 298 (1997).
90 As a means for addressing this issue, Human Rights Watch and others have recently
modified their activities around the issue of TNCs to include the activities of all businesses,
thereby eliminating the protest on the part of TNCs that they would have to behave tinder
one standard while domestic businesses would have the competitive advantage of less
stringent human rights and environmental standards.
[Vol. 23:57
Advancing the Language of Human Rights
There are flaws, however, in this race to the bottom argument.
First, there are a number of cost advantages and profit motives that
influence corporations to establish subsidiaries or to enter into pro-
duction contracts with foreign governments or corporations. Cer-
tainly, wage laws and labor regulations are among these considera-
tions, but they are not alone. For example, the potential to access new
foreign domestic markets and favorable tax laws of foreign jurisdic-
tions are important considerations. It is also important to note that
the infrastructural, technological, and legal amenities available in the
current locations of western corporate headquarters would encourage
these entities to stay where they currently are located. Finally, assum-
ing that the commitment on the part of some corporations to abide
by human rights standards though voluntary codes of conduct is sin-
cere, it does not make sense that legislation mandating the same types
of protections would result in a rapid expatriation. In this respect, the
adoption of voluntary codes of conduct is a valuable endeavor. It
shows that corporations are willing, and can afford, to raise their la-
bor and environmental standards-negating one of the primary ar-
guments against legislation mandating such improvements. The adop-
tion of codes of conduct also seems to have resulted in general
agreement that the "only way to solve [the] free-rider problem is
through collective action."9 1 This recognition that corporations have
collectively been free-riding and must collectively terminate this be-
havior is encouraging. However, it seems that the only real reason to
favor voluntary codes of conduct over legislation forcing compliance
with human rights law is to escape the potential of legal accountability
if the standards are violated.
C. Institutional Shifting: Responses of Economic
Institutions to Human Rights
The interactions between human rights advocates and corpora-
tions have resulted in a variety of experiments with codes of conduct.
A notable success of the human rights community in this effort has
been the relatively common incorporation of human rights language
per se in these codes. 92 This success can serve as a model for continued
negotiation with the international economic institutions discussed in
this section. The World Bank, IMF, and WTO, to varying degrees,
91 See, e.g., Spar, supra note 65, at 10.
92 See, e.g., supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing business principles
adopted by Reebok in 1990).
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have been slowly accepting their roles in the promotion and protec-
tion of the ideas encompassed by human rights. Notable, however, is
their discomfort with accepting and utilizing the strong utopian lan-
guage of international human rights law and norms in their stated
goals of sustainable development and poverty alleviation.
1. The World Bank
Prior to 1991, the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (the World Bank) failed to recognize any nexus between
its mission and human rights per se.93 Between 1990 and 1991, how-
ever, the World Bank adopted two new institution-wide directives to
stem the human rights abuses most often cited in connection with the
development projects in which it was involved. The first directive ad-
dressed the problem of involuntary settlement, which often occurs
when a development project is executed.94 The second directive con-
cerned the rights of indigenous people when development projects
interfere with their well-being 9 5
Thomas Berger, who in September 1991 was appointed Deputy
Chairman of the Independent Review of the Sardar Sarovar Projects,
commenting on the policy directives leading tip to his appointment,
states:
These policy changes at the World Bank reflect the world-
wide development of human rights concepts. These changes
constitute a recognition that large-scale projects, especially
in rural, wilderness and frontier areas, may displace people
just as war and natural calamities do. The policy changes fo-
cus on people who are being displaced by the advance of de-
velopment, and require that in any project the human rights
of the oustees must be respected. According to the ILO,
93 See CAROL R. WILSON, TIM WORLD BANK GROUP: A GUIDE TO INFORMATION SOURCES
294 (1991). This guide is a 247 page bibliography that gathers sources about the World
Bank that were published or translated into English from 1944 to 1990. Books, periodicals,
articles, government publications, pamphlets, and reference works are cited. The heading
"human rights" does not even appear in this index. Id. at 301. Under "labor" there is one
entry. Id. Similarly, under "Right to Development" there is one entry. Id. at 310. It is inter-
esting to note that while human rights were paid so little attention before the early 1990s,
there were twenty-two entries under the heading "environment." Id. at 290.
94 WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE, INVOLUNTARY RESETILEMENT (OP/BP
4.12) (2001).
9- WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (OP/BP 4.10) (up-
dated version to be adopted 2002).
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these rights should not be impaired on grounds of national
sovereignty or national economic interest. While such con-
siderations ihay justify a project; they do not justify the
nullification of these basic human rights. 96
These directives reflect a shift in World Bank policy. They also serve as
useful mechanisms to question the World Bank and the countries that
it aids regarding human rights violations. 97
After adopting the operational directives mentioned above, the
World Bank established an Independent Review panel in 1991 to
evaluate its Sardar Sarovar project in India.98 This review was not en-
tirely favorable and cited both the World Bank and the government of
India for human rights abuses in the execution of the development
project under review.99 Ultimately, the author of the review asserted
that development projects should be initiated only if they comport
with human rights and environmental standards. 100
As a result of negative reviews such as this one, the World Bank
has tried to redirect its development projects toward small scale, inte-
grated programs "that are economically sustainable, environmentally
benign and embraced by the people they purport to help."' 0' In 1997
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, stated his
96 Thomas R. Berger The World Bank's Independent Review of India's Sardar Sarovar Proj-
ects, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'V 33, 41 (1993). The World Bank appointed Mr. Berger
Deputy Chairman of the Independent Review of the Sardar Sarovar Projects in September
1991.
97 See id.
98 Id. at 33. "[Tlhe Independent Review developed out of controversy over whether
India and the governments of Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh have complied
with resettlement, rehabilitation, and environmental impact mitigation policies implicated
in the Sardar Sarovar Projects." Id. at 33 n.2. The Sardar Sarovar project is a massive dam
project in the Indian Narmada River valley to which the World Bank contributed a loan in
the amount of 450 million dollars.
99 "In some cases, involuntary resettlement resulting from the Sardar Sarovar offended
recognized norms of human rights." Id. at 42-43. The atthor of the review called this result
"ironic, given that both India and the World Bank have been in the forefront of efforts to
secure human rights." Berger, supra note 96, at 43.
100 Berger, supra note 96,. at 47-48. Berger contends that "effective and equitable de-
velopment" can be best achieved though integrating human rights obligations and a
commitment to the environment into the initial design of a project. He criticizes beliefs
that integrating these concerns into large-scale projects adds difficulty and cost. These
beliefs "imply that human and environmental costs are to be heavily discounted in project
planning and execution", which Berger argues are unacceptable in light of the past. He
recommends looking for alternatives to projects that require large scale relocation or se-
verely effect the environment. Id.
101 Richard W. Stevenson, The Chief Banker for the Nations at the Bottom of the Heap, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1997, §3, at 12.
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intention "to foster closer links among the human rights experts of
the treaty bodies, the mechanisms of the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights, and all the entities of the United Nations system,
including the World Bank."10 2 As part of this enlightened policy to-
ward development projects, the World Bank invited hundreds of envi-
ronmental, human rights, and poverty-fighting organizations to par-
ticipate in World Bank initiatives and project analyses. 0 In fact, the
World Bank produced a draft form Handbook on Good Practices for
Laws Relating to Non-Governmental Organizations. 0 4 Further, when
NGO's are involved in its projects, the World Bank now functions tin-
der a Good Practices Directive. 10 5 An increase in the number of NGOs
monitoring and advocating human rights in the context of World
Bank activity is a positive step in increasing enforcement of human
rights norms.10 6
Still, there is reason for skepticism. At least one NGO has warned
that the internationally protected right of freedom of association was
potentially infringed upon by the 1997 draft of the Handbook for laws
regulating NGOs and NGO behavior.10 7 Also, there is evidence that
even after the adoption of the directives mentioned above, the World
Bank has continued to violate the human rights it has asserted it will
aim to protect. 0 8 This is not surprising, given that, although individ-
ual member states may veto measures that aid countries that engage
102 Kofi A. Annan, Essay: Strengthening United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights:
Prospects and Priorities, 10 HARV. HUM. R'rs.J. 1, 7 (1997).
103 Stevenson, supra note 101, at 13.
104 TIlE INT'I. CENTER FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW, HANDBOOK OF GOOD PRACTICES FOR
LAWS RELATING 'To NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: DISCUSSION DRAFT (1997).
101 See TIlE WORLD BANK OPERATION MANUAL: GOOD PRACTICES: INVOLVING NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN BANK-SUPPORTED ACTIVITIES, GP 14.70 (2000). The
February 2000 OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 14.70 replaces the original WORLD BANK DI-
REcIVE 14.70, issued in March, 1998. Id. This WORLD BANK GOOD PRACTICES DIRECTvE
defines the role of NGOs in its activities. Among other things, it defines the types of NGO
involvement and the limitations of NGOs seeking to participate in World Bank activities.
106 See WORLD REPORT 1998, supra note 43, at xvi-vii.
107 LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUM. R-is., TlE WORLD BANK, NGOs AND FRFEDOM OF ASso-
CIATION: A CRITIQUE OF TIlE WORLD BANK'S DRAFT "HANDBOOK OF GOOD PRACTICES FOR
LAWS RELATING TO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS" 1 (1997) (arguing that im-
proper regulation of NGOs can restlt in governmental suppression of unpopular organi-
zations).
108 For example, between 1985 and 1993, the World Bank contributed more than half
of the 238 million dollars necessary to complete the Indonesian Kedung Ombo Dam Proj-
ect. The construction of this darn and reservoir resulted in the displacement of 30,000
people in violation of Indonesian law and World Bank Policy. IN "l'IE NAME OF DEVELOP-
MENT, supra note 47, at 4.
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in gross human rights violations, 10 9 the World Bank does not require
countries to guarantee observance of internationally recognized hu-
man rights as a precondition to receiving assistance. In fact, under the
Bank's Articles of Agreement, its only lending criteria remain "eco-
nomic considerations."'"0 While this term has recently been inter-
preted to include health, environmental, and gender related mat-
ters,111 the World Bank remains unwilling to condition its lending on
a demonstrated commitment to human rights.
As late as 1998, the World Bank continued to present itself as a
politically neutral institution, 112 independent of the human rights re-
gime. However, in September 1998, in celebration of the 50th Anni-
versary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the World
Bank published a document declaring its commitment to integrating
human rights concerns, especially economic, social, and cultural
rights, in its activities. 113 In this publication, the World Bank acknowl-
edged the need to reinvigorate its commitment to human rights,114
increase its contacts with civil society,115 and invited civil society to
109 See e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 262d (2000) (governing U.S. participation in international
financial institutions, such as the World Bank and encouraging U.S. representatives to vote
against aid to countries whose governments engage in gross human rights violations). At
least one commentator has argued at length that such legislation runs the risk of harmfully
politicizing the World Bank. See BARTRAM S. BROWN, TilE UNITED STATES AND flE POLI-
ICILZATION OF THE WORLD BANK: ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 232 (1992).
However, even he acknowledges that:
[t]he bank could justify considering the human rights implications of pro-
posed projects by referring to [its purpose enumerated in its Articles of
Agreement]. Apparently some consensus on the relevance of human rights
considerations to World Bank lending decisions has been reached among the
Group of Seven countries (US, Japan, Germany, Britain, France, Italy and
Canada) who control a decisive bloc of power within the Bank.
Id. at 240.
l0 DEVELOPING STATES, supra note 53, at 123.
11 IN THE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 47, at 3; see also VICTORIA E. Marmor-
stein, World Bank Power to Consider Human Rights Factors in Loan Decisions, 13 J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 113, 129-30 (1978).
112 For an assertion that the World Bank and other multilateral development banks are
apolitical institutions, see ROBERT KNELLER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON
WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: CONGRESSIONAL POLICY V. THE APOLITICAL PUR-
POSES AND FUNCTIONS OF TIlE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS 6-16 (1980).
"' See generally TIlE INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., THE WORLD BANK,
DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TIlE ROLE OF TIlE WORLD BANK (1998).
114 Id. at 1-3.
il Id. at 4, 26-29.
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"continue to press the needs of the neglected, the isolated, and the
victimized." 116
Starting relatively quietly in June of 1999 and much more notably
in November 1999, large numbers of activists and protesters began a
concerted and loosely connected struggle to bring attention to the
actions of the World Bank, IMF, WTO, and other international eco-
nomic actors. Their activities brought a great level of attention to the
issues surrounding the activities of these economic institutions and
their social and environmental impacts. By raising popular awareness
of economic globalization and World Bank activity, such protests have
arguably placed the human rights community in a better position to
negotiate with the economic community. 117
This Article concerns itself with the contacts and negotiations
between these two communities and, more importantly, the product
of these contacts. It encourages human rights advocates to use this
improved position to its fullest advantage, keeping in mind the power
of the utopian language of human rights and its rhetorical appeal to a
democratic public. As the human rights community makes inroads
with the World Bank and other institutions, it is essential that human
rights advocates adhere to the traditional language of human rights
rather than seek the approbation associated with the traditionally
economic language of the World Bank or other economic institutions.
2. The International Monetary Fund
Compared to the World Bank, the IMF continues to operate in
greater isolation from human rights concerns.118 In part, this is due to
the IMF's primary concern with implementing macroeconomic poli-
cies that lead to "high productivity, high employment, high savings
and consequently more investment and a higher flow of export
trade." 119 The organization is less involved with the microeconomic
issues in which the World Bank participates. 12 0 While the World Bank
116 Id. at 30.
U7 The efficacy of the protests, however, is neither the focus nor the concern of this
Article. The protests by rights activists, in the framework of this Article, occur either on the
margins of negotiations with the economic community or as a predecessor to such nego-
tiations.
118 See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Crossing the Rubicon: Synthesizing the Soft International Law
of the IMF and Human Rights, 11 B.U. INr'L. L.J. 81, 87-88 (1993).
19 DEVELOPING STrA-TES, supra note 53, at 95.
120 The IMF provides loans to countries facing balance-of-payment problems for the
purpose of restoring conditions for sustainable economic growth. These loans enable
countries to rebuild their monetary reserves, stabilize their currencies, and continue pay-
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or regional development banks lend for specific projects, the IMF in-
stead assists countries for discrete periods of time. Its macro level of
operations, therefore, has sheltered the IMF from a direct linkage to
human rights violations for longer than the World Bank or regional
development banks.121 Additionally, the shorter time frame of IMF
involvement makes it difficult for the IMF to require member states to
improve their human rights records during the period of IMF in-
volvement in a particular project. 22
Historically, the IMF was extremely reluctant to publicly suggest
that it should play a role in the promotion of human rights objec-
tives.123 Since its inception, however, the IMF has been in a powerful
position to influence human rights implementation in its member
states.' 24 Two mechanisms within the IMF procedures, Article IV con-
sultation and conditionality, create avenues via which the IMF could
advance human rights. 25 The IMF may consider political issues in
ing for imports without having to impose trade restrictions or other strict monetary meas-
ures. See Rajagopal, supra note 118, at 89.
121 See supra notes 94, 95, and accompanying text (discussing the World Bank Direc-
tives regarding involuntary resettlement and indigenous peoples).
122 See Rajagopal, supra note 118, at 89-92.
123 Daniel D. Bradlow, Symposium: Social Justice and Development: Critical Issues Facing the
Bretton Woods System, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 78-79 (1996). Further,
Bradlow contends that it is difficult to even find the IMF's policy on human rights. The
writings and statements of its representatives are the main indication of an IMF position
on human rights. These writings and statements, however, send contradictory messages.
They sometimes recognize the importance of human rights to the development process
but at other times suggest that the IMF can not play a role in promoting human rights.
Bradlow argues that these statements do not, however, "explain why, if human rights are so
important, the IMF can ignore them in its operations and policies." Id. at 79 (citation
omitted).
124 Id. at 50.
125 Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement requires the IMF to engage in regular
consultations with its member states about their exchange rate policies. Articles of Agree-
ment of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, art. IV, sec. 1, 29 U.S.T. 2203,
2208-10, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 51 [hereinafter IMF Articles]. For a description of Article IV con-
sultations, see, for example, RICHARD W, EDWARDS, JR., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COL-
LABORATION 22, 558-68, 571-80 (1985). In practice, these consultations have often ex-
tended into a wide range of domestic policies. Bradlow, noting the scope of the
consultations, suggests that the IMF has the capability of influencing the human rights
practices in its Member States. See generally Bradlow, supra note 123. (citations omitted).
During these consultations, "the IMF has been known to engage the Member State in dis-
cussions of its policies relating to health care, environment, welfare, housing, unemploy-
ment, labor markets, military expenditures, and certain aspects of the management of the
State's public sector." Id at 50.
Consultations, used by the IMF to develop its policies toward individual countries, can
influence the conditions that a country must meet in order to access IMF funds. The de-
gree of the IMF's influence varies depending on the Member State's need for financial
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conducting consultation and in determining conditionality factors.126
In fact, the IMF has more freedom to consider human rights issues
than does the World Bank.12 7 While the World Bank specifically began
considering human rights issues some time ago, the IMF historically
interpreted its Articles in a way that to allowed it to remain uninvolved
in advancing human rights. 128 The IMF did not construe its responsi-
bility as one that required promoting human rights. Rather it con-
strued its responsibility only as a duty to address the "social dimen-
sions" of the macroeconomic policies it prescribes for member
states.129
In 1995, however, there were two indications that the IMF was
becoming more aware of it's unique position to affect human rights.
The first indication was the public IMF acknowledgment that "the
importance of social issues for sustainable economic and social devel-
opment has become increasingly evident." 30 At that time, the IMF
recognized that it holds an important position of persuasion and ex-
pressed its intention to use that position to further "improv[e] gov-
ernments' capacity to monitor social developments and pursue trans-
parent social policies."131 The IMF, however, expressed its intention to
do this through policy discussions and technical assistance 32 rather
than by establishing human rights or economic justice conditions on
support. Since the advice given by the IMF in the Article IV consultations may be con-
verted into the conditionalities attached to IMF financing, the IMF is able to exert greater
influence over those Member States who need or expect to need its financial assistance. Id.
126 SeeJosEPII GOLD, INT'L MONETARY FUND, TIlE RULE OF LAW IN TIlE IMF 61 (1980).
For more on conditionality and its relation to human rights, see generally Michael Lucas,
The International Monetary Fund's Conditionality and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights: An Attempt to Define the Relation, 25 REVUE BELGE DE DEDROIT
INTERNAIIONAL [Beligan Review of International Law] 104 (1992).
127 Bradlow, supra note 123, at 81.
128 See GOLD, supra note 126, at 61. Summarizing the IMF's official position, former
IMF President, Michel Camdessus, has stated, "Nothing in our articles tells us that we have
to look at the moral quality of the policies of the country. Nor do we have to consider
whether the coun try is perfectly democratic or not."J. Oloka-Onyango, Beyond the Rhetoric:
Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.. 1, 25 n.141
(1995).
129 See INT'L MONETARY FUND, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF TIE IMF's POLICY DIALOGUE I-
4 (1995), available at http://www.inif.org/external/np/exr/facts/social.htm (last visited
Oct. 2, 2002) [hereinafter IMF POLICY DIALOGUE]. This pamphlet was presented by the
staff of the IMF for the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, March 6-
12, 1995.
1SO Id. at 1.
I1 Id. at 3.
132 Id.
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the use of IMF funds. 3 3 The second indication of the IMF's increasing
human rights awareness was its explicit recognition of the potential
benefit of consultation with United Nations agencies with expertise
on the "social dimensions" of human rights. 34 At that time, however,
the IMF only hinted at the need to begin consultation with NGOs. 35
Emerging from its 1999 annual meeting, the IMF began to
openly and consistently acknowledge a role in poverty reduction and
its associated human rights protections. At that time it decided to
strengthen its focus on poverty by replacing the Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility (ESAF) with the Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (PRGF). 36 Loans under the PRGF are provided to the world's
poorest countries and are based on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSP), which articulate each borrowing country's strategy for pov-
erty reduction and integrate macroeconomic, structural, and social
policies into one document. The key features that distinguish the
PRGF/PRSP procedure from the ESAF include vesting the borrowing
country with design and ownership of its own poverty reduction strat-
egy; integral participation of the World Bank in all poverty reduction
133 Id. at 4-6.
134 "The IMF is collaborating closely with the World Bank and other agencies in the
design, implementation, and monitoring of social policies." IMF POLICY DIALOGUE, supra
note 129, at 2.
For example, the IMF stated:
Improvement of monitoring and social policies and social indicators in the
context of IMF-supported programs is being pursued as central to the
achievement of sustainable high-quality growth. Improving collaboration with
the World Bank, U.N. agencies, and others, with the objective that each institu-
tion focus on areas of comparative advantage, is the best way to achieve-
without duplication of work-a better follow-up on the implementation of
social policies in programs.
Id. at 27-28 (emphasis added).
136 This decision emerged out of the annual IMF meeting of September 1999. The
PRGF replaced the ESAF as the primary loan assistance program to poor countries facing
balance of payment problems. The key features of this program are described herein. For
a more detailed description of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, see INT'L
MONETARY FUNn, TIlE IMF's POVERTY REDUCtlION AND GROWrH FACILITY (PRGF): A
FAc-iSIIEET (Mar. 2001), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prgf.htm (last
visited Oct. 2, 2002) [hereinafter POVERTY REDUCTION]. Prior to 1999, the IMF provided
assistance to low-income countries through the ESAF. ESAF arrangements, established in
1987, provide medium-term loans on concessional terms to support macroeconomic ad-
justment and domestic reforms in poor countries facing trade deficits. For a more detailed
description of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, see INT'L MONETARY FUND,
IMF CONCESSIONAL FINANCING TuROUGn ESAF (Sept. 1999), at http://www.imf.org/ex-
ternal/np/exr/facts/esaf.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002).
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strategies; and involvement of scholars, international institutions,
NGOs, and civil society generally in the design of the PRSPs.' 37
The IMF now intends to maintain consideration and incorpora-
tion of social policies at the level of the PRSP.138 If PRSPs function as
they are designed, the IMF's involvement in a given country's eco-
nomic policy could provide borrowing countries with the opportunity
to both assess their human rights situations and to design and imple-
ment strategies for improving domestic human rights protections.
The May 2000 PRSP of Burkina Faso exemplifies a strategy that
"places a high priority on human rights in its development and struc-
tural adjustment efforts." 139 Other countries took Burkina Faso's lead
in viewing the PRSP as an opportunity to assess how better protection
of human rights can aid in the development of their countries and
how increased economic development can aid their efforts to advance
human rights. 140
137 See POVERTY REDUCTION, supra note 136.
l38 See id. It should be noted that the IMF is still unwilling to use conditionality as a way
of promoting or encouraging respect for human rights in borrowing countries. Masood
Ahmed et al., Refocussing IF Conditionality, 38 FIN. & DEv. 4 (2001), available at 2001 WL
19654132.
139 Sergio Pereira Leite, Human Rights and the IMF 38 FIN. & DEv. 4 (2001), available at
2001 WL 19654133.
[T] he May 2000 PRSP of Burkina Faso centers on human security: economic
security (access to education, vocational training, and paid employment),
health security (access to low-cost preventive and curative medical care), food
security (access to basic foodstuffs and safe water), environmental security
(preservation of the environment), and individual and political security (the
rule of law, responsibility, participation, efficiency, and transparency). The
Burkinab6 strategy does not promise that human security will be fully
achieved during the life of the program, but it places a high priority on hu-
man rights in its development and structural adjustment efforts.
Id.
140 Countries that have involved human rights in their poverty reduction strategy in-
clude Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Vietnam.
Id. Sergio Pereira Leite notes that:
Nicaragua's September 2001 PRSP proposes measures to demarcate lands be-
longing to indigenous communities, assist the poor to meet housing needs,
protect children in high-risk conditions, implement programs for the elderly,
prevent domestic violence, strengthen the Office for Human Rights, and pro-
tect the rights of indigenous peoples. Rwanda's November 2000 PRSP in-
cludes a framework for good governance that incorporates a human rights
program, as well as capacity building for the country's Human Rights Com-
mission.
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The IMF's position on human rights demonstrates its interest in
self-improvement and its ability to contribute to poverty alleviation-
and thereby promote human rights. The degree and speed by which
the IMF has re-oriented itself with regard to human rights is notable.
Still, there is room for improvement. The IMF continues to view itself
as an organization fundamentally unable to analyze human rights
situations and concerns. Encouragingly, the IMF has made clear its
commitment to continued improvement of its activities. 141 It has
stated that it will depend on other international institutions, the work
of NGOs, and civil society to help it in this arena.142 Marked im-
provement to IMF policy can surely be made by involving these con-
tributors. As will be discussed below, the vigilance of these actors in
promoting the utopian language and ideas of human rights is essen-
tial to ensure that human rights are protected all over the world.
3. The World Trade Organization
The WTO is, without debate, the multilateral economic institu-
tion making the last stand for isolating its policies and practices from
the incursions of human rights concerns. The historical progression
of the WTO's position on collaboration with other multilateral institu-
tions, NGOs, and civil society is very similar to such collaboration by
the World Bank and the IMF. Until recently, the WTO had not fos-
tered any real communication with its economic counterparts-de-
spite agreements between the institutions to do so. 1 4 3 Further, it had
not established formal methods for cooperation and communication
between itself and the United Nations, the United Nation's human
rights organs, or members of civil society, including NGOs.
Since 1999, the United Nations Sub-Commission on Promotion
and Protection of Minorities has repeatedly publicized its concerns
regarding the insular, non-transparent, non-democratic nature of
WTO proceduresI 44 and the substantive effect of particular WTO
141 See. e.g., IMF POLICY DIALOGUE, supra note 129, at 27-28. See generally. INT'L MONE-
TARY FUND ET AL., A BETrER WORLD FOR ALL (2000), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/jointpub/world/2000/eng/bwae.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2002) [herein-
after A BE'IrER WORLD FOR ALL].
142 Leite, supra note 139.
143 See WTO, COHERENCE-CLOSER COOPERATION BETWEEN MULTILATERAL INSTITU-
TIONS, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher-e/cohere.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 2, 2002) (containing links to all relevant documents regarding coherence and
cooperation with the World Bank and the IMF).
144 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HU-
MAN RIGHTS, TIE REALIZATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: HUMAN
20031
Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 23:57
rules or practices.1 45 Commentators have also noted the insular nature
of the WTO, the potential negative effects of the WTO's work on hu-
man rights, and the organization's reluctance to engage sectors of the
international community concerned with human rights.146
It was not until its Fourth Ministerial Conference held in Doha,
Qatar in November 2001, that the WTO first indicated some response
to calls for change in its policy. The Doha Development Agenda,
Which resulted from this conference, refocuses the work of the WTO
to the situation of the world's poorest nations and people. 147 Moreo-
ver, there is ample evidence that as a result of the Doha Development
Agenda the WTO is undergoing a significant shift in its orientation
and openness to human rights concerns and the welfare of the indi-
viduals affected by its work. 148 One example of this shift is the W'TO's
2002 Annual Report, which acknowledges that "certain adjustments to
RIGIHTS AS TIlE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT AND FINANCE
POLICY AND PRACTICE, U.N. Doc. E/CN/Sub.2/1999/11 (1999); UNIEID NATIONS Eco-
NOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ARISING IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGnS: STATE-
MENT OF TIlE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
TO THE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1999/9 (1999).
145 See UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, THE REALIZATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS
AS THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT AND FINANCE POLICY
AND PRACTICE, U.N. Doc. E/CN/Sub.2/1999/11 (1999); UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL COUNCIL, SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ARISING IN ILE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGITS: STATEMENT OF HIIE
UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGIITS TO TIlE MIN-
ISTERIAL CONFERENCE OF TILE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/9
(1999); UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGIIS, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULIIIRAL RIGIIIS: TIlE IMPACT OF TilE AGREEMENT ON
TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGIS ON HUMAN RIGII-S, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (2001); UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL,
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGIs: LIBERALIZA-
TION OF TRADE IN SERVICES AND HUMAN RIGiTS, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9
(2002); UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGITS, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGIITs: GLOBALIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON
TFE FULL ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGiTS, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/54 (2002) (encom-
passing the report by the High Commissioner on Human Rights regarding human rights
approaches to the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture).
146 See, e.g., Howse & Mutua, supra note 7, at 3.
147 WTO, MINISTERIA. DECLARATION, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 14, 2001), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/miniiste/min01le/mindecl-e.htm (last visited
Nov. 9, 2002).
148 See, e.g., Mike Moore, Making Globalization Work, Speech to the International Con-
federation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) (Feb. 20, 2002), available at http://www.wto.
org/wto/english/newse/spmm76_e.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002).
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the [WTO] rules [are] needed if the trading system is to better reflect
the social, economic, and political conditions of a rapidly changing
world." 149 In this report, the W'TO also addresses the high level of
concern on the part of the United Nations, academic commentators,
and NGOs regarding the WTOs' lack of transparency and abysmal
record for consulting with civil society and NGOs. 150
One proposal for facilitating WTO consideration of human rights
law is to establish a human rights office at the World Trade Organiza-
tion. 151 This proposal recognizes the current failings of both unilat-
eral and multilateral human rights enforcement mechanisms. It ar-
gues that human rights advocacy and WTO enforcement mechanisms
should be combined in order to take advantage of the strengths of the
two systems. 52 Such a combination would be comprised of a multilat-
eral regime using sanctions to enforce core human rights and remedy
violations of those rights. Thus, the might of unilateral actions, in the
149 WTO, ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 2 (2002). The Annual Report also notes:
Agreement still remains elusive on precisely how existing rules should be
changed and what form necessary new rules should take. But at Doha the
WTO achieved something that many skeptics had suggested was beyond the
organization's grasp: the launch of a new trade round. Even the sternest crit-
ics of globalization today accept that the alternative to multilateral rules is re-
liance on the law of the jungle. With the Doha Development Agenda, we are
now on course to negotiate the necessary changes and new rules.
Id. at 2.
1o Id at 4. The report states, in part:
Although there is no consensus among WTO Members in favour of involving
NGOs directly in the organization's work, the existing guidelines on external
relations were designed by Members to give the Secretariat an appropriate
degree of flexibility to allow responsible NGOs a voice in the dialogue. Within
these guidelines, an increasing number of symposia have been held, involving
a wide range of civil society actors, including parliamentarians, chambers of
commerce, trade unions and many groups with particular focus on such is-
sues as development and the environment. We have also greatly improved the
dissemination of information to the general public through our website,
which in the first quarter of 2002 recorded more than half a million visitors
per month. Visitors downloaded monthly the equivalent of over 100 million
pages of text.
Id.
151 Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Hu-
man Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization, 11 Am. U.J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 1, 4 (1996). For another proposal to introduce rights into the WTO, see Daniel S.
Ehrenberg, From Intention to Action: An ILO-GATT/WTO Enforcement Regime for International
Labor Rights, in HUMAN RIGHrs, LABOR RiGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 163, 163-181
(Compa & Diamond eds., 1996).
152 Stirling, supra note 151, at 33.
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form of trade sanctions by a powerful nation, can be made even
mightier by the multilateral support of other less powerful nations. 53
One benefit of this approach is the possibility that a human rights
office within the WTO could ensure that human rights are integrated
into WTO policies in a transparent and predictable manner.
Another strategy for WTO reform lies in Article XX of the GATIT.
It is widely accepted that human rights advocates should focus on this
section to support the inclusion of human rights concerns in the pol-
icy and decisions of the WTO.154 Article XX of the GATI states that
nothing in the GATT
shall be construed to prevent the enforcement by any con-
tracting party of measures ... necessary to protect public
morals ... human, animal or plant life or health, [or] relat-
ing to the conservation of exhaustible natural resource
measures ... essential to the acquisition or distribution of
products in general or local short supply [and] ... relating
to the products of prison labour.155
One commentator contends that consideration of basic human
rights has been a part of the GAIT system since its inception. She
points out that Article XX of the GATT, which allows the exclusion of
products made with prison labor, has never been challenged by the
GATT/WTO member states. 156 In fact, through advocating for a WTO
social clause, a number of nations have pushed to include a wider
range of human rights provisions. 15 7 Furthermore, Article XX(e) al-
ready lays the groundwork for a human rights body within the WTO.
Trade and human rights are already linked within the GAT because
"Article XX(e) appears to permit one member to use trade sanctions
to protect the human rights of citizens of another member." 58
153 Id.
154 See generally id.; Howse & Matua, supra note 7 (pointing to Article XX as a mecha-
nism for the inclusion of human rights concerns in the policies and decisions of the
wTO).
155 GATT, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, G1 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 184, 262. This was
amended in 1994. See id. at art. XX.
156 Stirling, supra note 151, at 35-36.
157 A number of nations have declared their commitment to a wide range of labor pro-
tections, leading to the establishment of the World Commission on the Social Dimension
of Globalization within the International Labour Organization. See INTERNAT1ONAL LA-
BOUR ORGANIZATION, WORLD COMMISSION ON TIE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF GLOBALIZATION:
BACKGROUNn, at http://www.ido.org/public.english/wcsdg/background.htm (last vi-sited
Oct. 16, 2002).
158 Stirling, supra note 151, at 38.
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This proposal is appealing because it provides a multilateral
mechanism for the enforcement of human rights that is intrinsically
tied to entry into globalized trade. It is problematic, though, because
it limits exposure to sanctions by limiting the rights-which if violated
would be legitimate grounds for multilateral trade sanctions-to the
most widely accepted civil and political rights.159 Although this ad-
heres to the traditional hierarchical structure of human rights, such a
proposal has the effect of undermining a strand of the genealogy of
Article XX, the very hook used to validate the proposal for a human
rights office at the WTO.160
The WTO is no longer as insular or as opaque as it was just two
years ago. The Doha Development Agenda changed the landscape for
the WTO and for those who advocate for WTO inclusion of human
rights concerns. Although it has not created official avenues for civil
society's and the United Nations human rights bodies' participation,
these sectors clearly have started to enter into negotiations with the
WTO.
Mike Moore, the Director-General of the WTO, stated unequivo-
cally in his farewell address to the WTO General Counsel that the
WTO has a new focus to help the world's poor.161 As his closing re-
mark he stated: "I will continue to serve the public. I can think of no
greater vocation. I may even join an NGO or march with the protest-
ers to the gates of this very institution. You will know me immediately.
My banner will say 'Justice Now, Finish the Round.' 162 If this should
ever come to pass, perhaps the new WTO Director General, Dr. Su-
159 Id. at 39. "These rights would include freedom from torture, collective punish-
ments, prolonged arbitrary detention, genocide, slavery, or threats to commit any of these
acts." Id.
160 See ICESCR, supra note 84, at art. 7 (recognizing the right of everyone to the en-
joyment of just and favorable conditions of work, which include fair wages and equal re-
muneration for work of equal value, as well as a right to safe and healthy working condi-
tions). Stirling does, however, include freedom from slavery in her short list of human
rights which should be enforced by the proposed WTO human rights body. Stirling, supra
note 151, at 39. The right to freedom from slavery is set out in the ICCPR, stating: "No one
shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall be prohibited."
ICCPR supra note 84, at art. 8.
161 See Mike Moore, Director General's Farewell Speech to the General Council (July 31, 2002),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/spmm-e/spmm89_e.htm (last visited
Oct. 2, 2002). He states therein that "The Doha Development Agenda is urgent too be-
cause more than half of the world's population continue to live on less than 2 dollars a day
and a successful conclusion to the round can help lift billions of people out of poverty.
This Agenda is about them. Our greatest motivation is the people we serve." Id.
162 Id.
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pachai Panitchpakdi, will see fit to open the doors and talk with both
his predecessor and his newly befriended NGO colleagues.
4. Shaping a Nexus: Encounters Between International Financial
Institutions and Human Rights
International economic institutions quite clearly are uncomfort-
able with the language of human rights. They prefer to address
specific "social issues" rather than open themselves to the far broader
and more substantive area of human rights. To illustrate, in 2000 the
IMF, together with the United Nations, the World Bank, and
ECOSOC, published A Better World for All, which stated the joint com-
mitment of these organizations to alleviate poverty and consider de-
velopment-related issues. 163 Although this document does mention
human rights generally, it neither names specific articles of the basic
human rights documents nor directly refers to specific human rights
per se. When referring to its specific goal of reducing infant mortality
rates, for example, the document does not refer to this "social issue"
as embodied in Article 12(2) (a) of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 64
Likewise, the IMF's and the World Bank's uneasiness with assign-
ing these "social issues" their internationally accepted status as human
rights was again made clear in January 2002 when the IMF Managing
Director and the World Bank President held a Townhall Meeting with
civil society representatives participating in the International Confer-
ence on Poverty Reduction Strategies. When addressing the particular
topic of labor and union movements on behalf of both institutions,
James Wolfensohn, the World Bank President, gave this illustrative
comment:
Ijust met a few months ago with John Sweeney on the sub-
ject, and we're in regular contact with the international la-
bor union movements to try and see what we can do to
bridge that gap. But I really believe that, while we don't call
it a rights-based approach, which Mrs. Robinson would like
us to do, on each issue we are, in fact, addressing the ques-
tions which Mrs. Robinson is addressing.
163 Seegenerally A BE-I-ER WORLI) FOR ALL, supra note 141.
164 See ICESCR, supra note 84, at art. 12 (2) (a). The document does, however, detail the
combined goals of all these organizations to improve and promote this and other "social
issues" which, in the ICESCR and the ICCPR, have previously been accorded the status of
rights. See generally A BEYrrE WORLn FOR ALL, supra note 141.
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I don't want to move to a rights-based approach because I
think I'm stronger in what I'm doing, but we will continue
the discussion with Mrs. Robinson on whether it should be
[framed that way] .... 165
While clearly acknowledging the importance of the goals enumerated
in established human rights instruments, and in fact stating that the
World Bank and the IMF are "addressing the questions" which human
rights law aims to address, the reluctance of the World Bank President
to take a "rights-based" approach is puzzling. If the work of these
financial institutions is, as President Wolfensohn suggests, substan-
tially equivalent to what it would be if they used a rights-based ap-
proach, it seems essential to press for the reasons behind their reluc-
tance to use the language of rights.
While there may be disagreement over which rights international
financial institutions have a responsibility to uphold, there should be
little disagreement that these institutions now consider the ideas em-
bodied by human rights a factor in their operations. Increasingly,
human rights advocates and international law scholars are focusing
on these institutions. Consequently, a perceptible institutional aware-
ness of the importance of advancing universally accepted human
rights has taken hold.
In the World Bank and increasingly in the IMF, this awareness has
now taken a relatively strong hold. In the WTO, however, it is still in
the early stages of development and remains opaque and largely
undefined. This institutional shift is crucial to increasing the promo-
tion of human rights and the quality of human rights enforcement
mechanisms.166 Similarly, the entry of human rights into the every-day
conduct of transnational corporations is evidenced in the voluntary as
well as government-mandated and institutionally imposed codes of
conduct discussed herein.
The question should no longer be whether these economic inter-
national institutions and transnational corporate actors will become
locations for the protection and advancement of human rights but
rather how this shift will come about. This brings to the fore a whole
range of pressing inquiries, some of which have been addressed in the
16 Townhall Meeting: IMF Managing Director Host Kohler and World Bank President James
Wolfensohn with Civil Society Representatives Participating in the International Conference on Pot-
erty Reduction Strategies (Jan. 17, 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/
2002/tr020117a.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002).
166 See, e.g., Stirling, supra note 151, at 15-16, 45-46.
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discussion above: in what capacity will traditionally economic actors
advance human rights; to what extent will they do so; and which rights
should be promoted or enforced. While the questions are simple, the
answers will be complex. They should be developed carefully with the
intention of encouraging active awareness of these rights and the rec-
ognition that international financial institutions can play a crucial
role in the implementation and enforcement of human rights. Long
overdue, the coming challenge is to maintain intellectual fortitude in
the advancement of human rights at the points of contact with the
economic sector.
For the purposes of this Article, it is important to be cognizant of
the entries that the human rights community, its law, and its norms
have made into the international economic sector. These entries
amount to a novel but tangible encounter that has been revealed
through the investigation undertaken above. The next section of this
Article discusses one specific aspect of this interaction: the language
used, defined, and developed during the interchange between human
rights institutions and advocates and their international economic
counterparts. Specifically, this Article addresses the imperative of
conducting the interaction between these two international domains
in a language that maintains the compelling essence of human rights.
It argues that this should be done in the interest of creating and ad-
vancing a language of encounter that strengthens and promotes
rights. Essentially, it is an optimistic view of the potential for forging
language that enhances public international law and places human
rights concerns squarely at the center of international economic activ-
ity and policy.
III. ANALYSIS OF A DISCOURSE
A. The Iternational Plane
Many social scientists have noted the emergence of "the Global
City" or its equivalent. 167 The amalgamation of international commu-
nities with differing interests, however, is better described for the
167 See SASKIA SASSEN, TIlE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO 335 (1991). Sas-
sen points to the many ways that the distinctions between important cities are merging or
blurring. For example, she illustrates that this is happening through a hegemonization of
culture with the result that each city is losing its individual character, and she also proposes
that for those individuals whose work and leisure makes them dependent on more than
one of these hubs, the boundaries that once defined travel between countries are disap-
pearing. See id. at 335-38.
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purposes of this Article as the international plane. This distinction is
necessary because the image of a global city or the global village im-
plies a theoretical space where the inhabiting population gathers into
one group, in a domain small enough to imagine its current and fu-
ture boundaries.1 68 Further, this image implies that there is some form
of infrastructure, generally government, necessary to conduct the ne-
gotiations and compromises needed for a culturally disparate and di-
verse populace to co-exist.1 69
The novelty of the interactions between human rights and inter-
national economic actors suggests a space much different than that of
the global city. The international plane envisioned here, though
identifiable, is still largely uncharted. It is possible to identify the indi-
viduals, groups, and institutions participating therein. It is also feasi-
ble to discern the locations of action and interaction of these parties.
But defining locations of activity is different than identifying a cohe-
sive and delineated place called a city. The international plane is not a
singular location with definable boundaries. In fact, boundaries cur-
rently seem to be its antitheses structure, from which the participants
aim to escape. In this way, the international plane is different than a
city.
Additionally, unlike a village or a city, there is no singular form of
government under which all participants are expected to behave. 70 A
cohesive set of decrees constituting governmental control does not
exist; there is no legal structure with which all the actors in this inter-
national plane must comply. The locations of activity on the interna-
tional plane-the various forms of international law, cross-border
business transactions, immigration, tourism, et cetera-each have
rules governing particular activities or fields of work. For example,
international financial institutions have articles of agreement and are
founded on a shared philosophy that aims to advance liberal eco-
168 Black's Law Dictionary defines village as: "a modest assemblage of houses and
buildings for dwellings and business... [or] a municipal corporation with a smaller popu-
lation than a city." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 1563. A city is defined as "a
municipal corporation ... headed by a mayor and governed by a city council." Id. at 237.
169 See id. at 237, 1563 (defining city and village). It is not the purpose of this article to
discredit the use of terms like global city and global village. However, it is important to
note how the use of cities and villages for illustrative analogy is not entirely accurate. Be-
cause this Article discusses issues that arise in the collision of populations that are real and
analogized, it is necessary to illustrate the failings of these words for the analytical pur-
poses of describing globalization.
170 For the suggestion that such an order is possible, see Kenneth S. Carlson, Interna-
tional Administrative Law: A Venture in Legal Theory, 8.1. PUB. L. 329, 329-77 (1959).
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nomic policies such as free and fair trade.' 71 Those advancing a global
economic order act in accordance with these philosophies. They
abide by and frame their work around the rules and policies central
to their institutions. Similarly, human rights institutions share a com-
mon vision, as evidenced by the Universal Declaration for Human
Rights and subsequent human rights instruments. 172 The individuals
participating in the development of human rights law act in accor-
dance with the philosophies, rules, and procedures that are common
to human rights actors and often distinct from those of economic ac-
tors.
Participation in the global involves reaching across national bor-
ders in an attempt to join people with commonalties on a global scale.
This act creates new places of activity. For example, internet specialists
and browsers connect with their foreign counterparts in the territory
they call cyberspace. Similarly, indigenous peoples transgress the
boundaries of nations and create a new location when they gather at
the United Nations for the annual meeting of the Working Group on
Indigenous Peoples. 173 The very name of the organization "Doctors
Without Borders" is indicative of this characteristic.
Within the legal profession, too, specialization and internation-
alization abounds. Immigration specialists work with their counter-
parts in various countries; human rights advocates do the same. They
create and populate sites of globalized activity. The World Bank and
the IMF have explicit policies of hiring lawyers from a wide range of
countries who are trained in international economic law.174 These
171 Compare IMF Articles, supra note 125, with Articles of Agreement of the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S.
134. It is not at all surprising that these institutional charters are very similar. They were
both born from the Bretton-Woods conference, which was executed by a small number of
participants with similar visions for economic stability.
172 This is not to diminish the differences between human rights documents. Clearly,
there are differences, but it is indisputable that there are also similarities in language, in
the rights advanced, and in the liberal philosophy that underlies the documents.
173 For a description of the creation of this United Nations Working Group see S.
JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (1996). For a detailed de-
scription of the success of this Working Group and evidence that it does provide a forum
for indigenous people from a multitude of countries to develop principles that will protect
them, see David Weissbrodt et al., An Analysis of the Forty-ninth Session of the United Nations
Sub-Comission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 11 HARV. HUM. R-rs.
J. 221, 237 (1998).
174 See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND, DIVERSITY PoLicy, available at http://www.inf.
org/external/np/adm/rec/policy/divpolicy.htm (visited Oct. 2, 2002) (stating the IMF's
commitment to strive for balance in the gender and nationality composition of its staff in
order to achieve its goal of creating a successful international work place).
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finance and economics-focused lawyers incarnate yet another com-
munity with its own interests. Although institutions, seminars, and
conferences are the actualization of these locations, they can exist
without physical or material places. These sites of activity can be
identified and are tangible without actual embodiment. Thus, even
actors not present physically in international institutions can partici-
pate in their particular specialized field at the international level.
Similarly, the domain that makes up international human rights activ-
ity does not cease to exist on days without international conferences
or meetings. Rather, this domain exists, at least on some level, simply
because people believe themselves to be participants in international
activity and actors on an international plane.
What seems to emerge, therefore, is not a single global city but
an accumulation of many theoretical locations that can be described
as communities or perhaps sovereigns of a sort. Each is composed of
individuals who, through self-identification with a particular activity or
profession, participate in the life of that community. 175 We can tenu-
ously call these communities sovereigns, because, to a large extent
thus far, they have governed themselves while creating a territory that
is not governed by the whole or by any superstructure. Each of these
communities are bound by a mass of conflicting laws and interests of
the various national jurisdictions of their participants. Upon entering
the international plane, however, their relations with one another are
also defined by the rules of the particular international community.
Yet there is no overarching government that regulates or provides a
single forum for interaction, cooperation, or conflict among these
internationalized communities. 176
This absence of government, defined mechanisms, and forums
for communication among the various communities that comprise
the international plane creates a vacuum. When two or more com-
munities expand or shift in a direction that impacts another commu-
175 SeeARjUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE 22-23 (1996) (portraying the propen-
sity to group cultures according to difference rather than similarity). While Appadurai may
be correct that "the emergent postnational order" may be based on relations between in-
terest groups, this Article challenges his assertion that the negotiations that make tip those
relations will result in "increased incivility and violence." Perhaps because this Article dis-
cusses the interaction between two communities that hold in common the liberal social
contract of the modern West, it focuses on points of cooperation rather than pure contes-
tation. See id. at 23.
176 See Carlson, supra note 170, at 182.
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nity's zone of interest, an encounter results. 77 The communities or
regimes then call either ignore any resulting discord or enter into ne-
gotiations. Negotiations, naturally, can either lead to compatibility or
continued and more elaborate discord. 78
Part II of this paper demonstrated one point of encounter: the
demonstrable interaction of the human rights domain and the inter-
national economic demesne. Presently, these two modern, liberal
realms, originated and maintained as separate worlds on the interna-
tional plane, are investigating each other. Of course there are points
of contact between these communities that remain in thorough dis-
cord. As the points of tumultuous conflict, they attract significant
popular attention.1 79 More surprising and encouraging about these
points of encounter, however, is the cooperation that emerges from
them. Part II demonstrated a series of encounters and long negotia-
tions that have resulted in significant cooperation. The remainder of
Part III discusses prospects for future encounters. Specifically, this sec-
tion examines the language that these interactions emit, illustrating
the importance of consciously maintaining and promoting the strong
aspirational language of human rights.
B. Prospects for Fut ure Encounters
As a preliminary matter, it is vital to examine the environment in
which the negotiations are taking place. The international economic
community and international human rights communities can not dis-
cern the limits of their present day scope and reach, much less their
future. They interact in a space not facilitated or regulated by any
177 One should note here that the remainder of the discussion further illustrates what
Robert 0. Keohane describes as "harmony;" the situation in which two international
communities' "policies (pursued without regard for the interests of others) are regarded
... as facilitating the attainment" of each community's goals. ROBERT 0. KEOIIANE, AFTER
HEGEMONY 53 (1984).
178 Id.
179 The failed MAI and the criticism that surrounded it illustrate this type of inter-
change. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. The rights that the MAI aimed to en-
force, as was discussed above, directly impacted upon pre-established universal human
rights. However, aware of the existence of human rights doctrine, especially in light of the
NAFTA and GATT negotiations, the OECD attempted to conduct the negotiation for the
MAI without regard for the conflicts between international economic and international
human rights law that it would create. Unwilling to negotiate directly with human rights
institutions or NGOs, however, the mutinous MAI would have created a site of unresolved
discord between the human rights community and the economic community. The result-
ing conflict, in fact, lead to the death of the MAI. Another, now infamous, example lies in
the 1999 anti-globalization protests and those that have subsequently ensued.
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governmental superstructure. Finally, the only potential resistors of
their interactions are the sovereign nations affected by the outcomes
of the interchange. Thus the obstacle to determining and implement-
ing results that promote and protect human rights will be the ability
to convince nations that, on balance and over time, the results serve
their interests.
The 1990s were an era of renewed and intense interest in foreign
direct investment. The human rights community, witnessing this activ-
ity, derived two conclusions. First, it concluded that TNC's and inves-
tors have a responsibility not to allow degradation of the environment
and abuse of the labor force to be considered tools for profit-
maximization. This conclusion fueled desires to implement codes of
conduct regulating the actions of transnational corporations. 180 Sec-
ond, as evidenced herein, as the desire to attract foreign capital and
investment experiences ebbed and more countries were willing to
sign treaties like the GAT, human rights groups saw the excitement
over neo-liberal economics as an opportunity to form ties with the
global economic actors and, thereby, to advance human rights.
Using international financial institutions, human rights advocates
hope to convince countries that have thus far resisted pressure to ac-
cept the legitimacy of liberal human rights to do so in concurrence
with western liberal economic models, or rather, to adopt liberalism
as a complete rather than as a bifurcated or partial package. Addi-
tionally, those countries that already have acquiesced to the liberal
economic model may be able to use financial institutions to
strengthen the pressure to observe and enforce human rights. If hu-
man rights or scrutiny over "social issues"18 1 are included as part of
the package of WTO, IMF, or World Bank membership, both of these
objectives will be furthered. Perhaps, if the benefit to a given country
of the liberal economic model is viewed as indisputable and sizable,
180 One should note that codes of conduct may have limited effect. For example, a re-
cent report shows that even though Nike has implemented a code of conduct, it never
posted a code of conduct on the premises of any of its Jakartan facilities, the workers had
never heard of a code of conduct, the terms of the code of conduct were never imple-
mented, and the code was commonly violated. See Nike Sweatshop Suit (Nat'l Public Radio
broadcast, Apr. 21, 1998) (on file with author);Jennifer Lin, Anti-Nike Backlash Growing over
Worker-Abuse Reports, THE FLORIDA TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville), Apr. 4, 1998, at Al (de-
scribing instances of worker abuse in Nike factories in Vietnam and South Korea).
181 The discussion herein of the IMF decision to examine social issues in connection
with its involvement in particular countries demonstrates that countries may be willing to
submit to examination and scrutiny of their domestic human rights practices in order to
access IMF funds. There have been no instances in which a country decided not to use
IMF funds because of this new policy.
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the cost of succumbing to human rights and enforcement thereof will
seem diminished in comparison.
This thought process has led human rights institutions and or-
ganizations to pressure the international economic community to in-
tegrate human rights into their activities. While it is notable that this
pressure results in various cooperative efforts between these two
communities, it should not be surprising. Both traditions emerged in
part from liberal ideology, and both sets of institutions aspired to cre-
ate a stable and peaceful world order. 82 Further, architects of both
systems believed that multilateral bodies are central to addressing
global problems. In order to legitimate their claims to universality,
both communities seek to persuade all sovereign nations that their
models for addressing global problems are meritorious. Additionally,
founders of the Bretton Woods System recognize that "a growing
number of economic, environmental, and social problems are beyond
the ability of the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT to manage." 83
Accordingly, they have commenced an inquiry on how these institu-
tions can respond to such problems. 184
One must also consider the similar attributes of the individuals
who make up both of these communities. Most have received exten-
sive education-many of them in the same educational facilities in
London, Oxford, Cambridge, New York, or Washington-during
which these individuals confirmed their membership in a cosmopoli-
tan class.'8 These common experiences simplify encounters by dimin-
ishing fundamental issues, such as the national language in which dis-
cussions will be conducted and the rules of professional and social
conduct to be observed with one another. These commonalties possi-
bly have assisted the human rights community in persuading their
economic counterparts to enter negotiations and in implementing
the outcomes of such negotiations.
182 See, e.g., Margaret Garritson de Vries, The Bretton Woods Conference and the Birth of the
International Monetary Fund, in BRErrON Woons, supra note 28, at 4 (stating that officials in
the U.S. State Department in the early 1940s, convinced that "economics had been the
missing ingredient in the faded League of Nations' efforts to secure world peace, were
thinking in terms of a liberal international trade regime after the war").
183 BRE-iON WOODS, supra note 28, at vii.
184 See id.
186 For examples of this experience see APPADURAI, supra note 175, at 1-23, 48-65. It is
also significant that English has been accepted overwhelmingly as the diplomatic national
language of this cosmopolitan class. For example, 96 members of the GATT conduct their
work in English alone. COULMAS, supra note 5, at 188.
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The ability to compromise about the subjects and areas for nego-
tiation has also been important in convincing the international eco-
nomic domain to interact with the human rights community. Codes of
conduct, IMF PRSPs, a human rights office at the WTO, and the im-
portance of the poor and underrepresented assume the continued
existence and vigor of the economic domain. This assumption has
created a space for financial institutions to permit human rights to
enter their fields without formally conceding their own set of bundled
sovereignty rights, which they would prefer to maintain. Successful
proposals for interaction between these two entities likely will further
human rights interests while assuring international financial actors
that this will not result in their own loss of autonomy or importance in
world affairs.
There is one final characteristic of the individuals who make up
these two particular legal communities. As lawyers, these individuals
are likely to be extremely focused on the importance and potency of
words.186 They belong to a profession that passionately haggles over
meanings of individual words in order to arrive at a definition most
favorable to the client or to the interest they serve.18 7 Further, as in-
ternational lawyers, most of them have experienced the power of lan-
guage when they have either been empowered or marginalized in
conversations, depending on their ability to speak various national
languages.
One should not underestimate the language-creating capacity
and experience of both societies. For example, many of the nouns
used in this essay-nouns as important and obvious as WTO, NAFTA,
GAIT IMF, World Bank, ICESCR, ICCPR, and UDHR-were created
and have entered into use since 1940. These communities also con-
tinue to adopt verbs and vest them with specific meanings that refer-
ence their particular activities. One such verb that will be addressed
below is "consult," though there are others like "coordinate," "ex-
haust" (domestic remedies), "intervene," and "adjust" each of which
have very specific definitions in particular contexts. Among people
who are formally trained or at least exposed to the importance of ne-
gotiation and "getting to yes," 18 the points of encounter of these
186 LAKOFF, supra note 4, at 12.
187 See, e.g., Chuang, supra note 3, at 73, 80-90 (discussing definitional issues regarding
the classification of forced labor and trafficking practices).
188 Each year, over 100 people are trained at Harvard Law School alone in a negotia-
tion seminar that teaches the negotiation models proposed in ROGER FislHER, GETrNG TM
YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIvING IN (2d ed. 1991). While it is not clear
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communities will be heavily centered on negotiations regarding the
promulgation and definition of the language that will define future
cooperation between them.
C. The Nexus of Different Languages for Special Purposes
At the nexus of these two very different languages for special
purposes-one focused on rights, the other on economic activity-
grows a new language for the purpose of integrating human rights
and international economic policies.189
If one envisions languages as tools that serve particular needs,
and further assumes that the users of such tools will choose language
suitable to their specialized purposes, it is natural to conclude that, as
communicative needs evolve, so must the languages used by their
speakers. 190 In the context of the nexus shaping between interna-
tional human rights and economic actors, there is evidence of this
evolution. The resulting language will likely be an amalgam of the two
original languages, which is better adapted to its purpose. 191 Linguists
have developed the terms "pidgin," "Creole," "lingua franca," and
"vehicular language" in order to explain the new languages that
emerged from traditional colonial era encounters.1 92 Largely referred
that it is one of the purposes of such workshops and of the book, the effect is that many of
the world's most educated and able negotiators are educated on the same methods and
rules of negotiation and share a common idea of what form such negotiations should take.
It is also relevant that this book is translated into many languages, providing this method-
ology to negotiators without English skills in a large portion of the world.
189 See COULMAS, supra note 5, at 154-66.
190 Id. at 154.
191 Examples of this result have already surfaced and will be discussed below.
192 ANiTiIONY & GATES, supra note 6, at 520; COULMAS, supra note 5, at 157; STEVEN
PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSnNCT: How TUE MIND CREATES LANGUAGE 33 (1995). In or-
der to facilitate the following discussion, readers should understand the definition of the
following terms: Pidgin: A simplified speech used for communication between people of
different languages. The linguistic variation known as " pidgin" develops in areas where
intense social intercourse between members of drastically different cultures takes place.
Pidgin, which develops out of this linguistic heterogeneity, is a simplified system of com-
munication. The maturation of pidgin and its adoption by subsequent generations results
in a creolization of the language. MariJ. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimina-
tion Law, and a Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1342 n.49 (1991).
Creole: a language based on two or more languages that serves as the native language of its
speakers; a creole language emerges when new students of a pidgin language do not have
access to the languages that originally formed the pidgin language and therefore learn the
pidgin language as an integral language. Creoles are sophisticated variations of pidgin with
increased vocabulary and grammatical devices and are considered normal languages by
sociolinguists. PINKER, supra, at 33; Matsuda, supra, at 1342-43. Lingua Franca: Any of vari-
ous languages used as common or commercial tongues among peoples of diverse speech;
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to as "trade languages" because of their colonial history, pidgin lan-
guages are the first to develop at locations of exchange after initial
unstable jargon becomes insufficient. 193
The language emerging from international economic and hu-
man rights encounters can be analogized to the pidgin language for-
mation of the colonization era. These common forms of language ad-
aptation arose from "situations of social pressure and inequality" 194
and were typically despised for lacking the "prestige of a literary tradi-
tion and socially respected speakers."1 95 Thus, the language emerging
from the nexus of these two communities matches the characteristics
of a pidgin language with the possible exception of the social respect
that its speakers enjoy.196 Nonetheless, the analogy is at least func-
tional in every other respect. Both the human rights and the interna-
tional economic communities feel pressure to interact in order to fur-
ther their own aims. Additionally, these two international law domains
are unequal in popularity and enforceability. 197 Finally, the pidgin
language emerging from the interaction of these two communities
will be influenced by, but independent of, the literary tradition of ei-
ther international economic law or human rights. 198
something resembling a common language. Vehicular Language: In its broader definition,
this term can be used synonymously with lingua franca. COULMAS, supra note 5, at 190
(citing WilliamJ. Samarin, Lingua Francas of the World, inJ.A. FISHERMAN, READINGS IN ThE
SOCIOLOGV Ov LANGUAGE 661 (1968)).
193 COULMAS, supra note 5, at 161-62; PINKER, supra note 192, at 33-34.
194 COULMAS, supra note 5, at 158-59.
195 Id. at 159.
196 While it is true that the individuals forging links between these two communities
are highly scrutinized by their colleagues, there is no evidence that they are generally dis-
respected within their own fields.
197 For another articulation of this inequality, see David Kennedy, Receiving the Interna-
tional, 10 CONN.J. INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (1994).
198 It is interesting and important to note that pidgin languages and linguas franca are
not a phenomenon only of historical economic activity between people of different ori-
gins. There is evidence that for many leaders of economic policy from non-English- speak-
ing nations, the ability to communicate at some level of proficiency was essential in an
economic world order dominated by English. Victor L. Urquidi, one of the primary Mexi-
can representatives at the Bretton Woods Conference writes:
Because my English was better than Cosio-Villegas's, though far from entirely
correct (English, by the way, was the only official working language and no
simultaneous interpretation was available), I had drafted [a statement on the
reorientation of the IMF and World Bank goals to include development
rather than only reconstruction] myself and read it out loud.
Urquidi, supra note 18, at 42.
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Thus far, the language that has emerged from the points of con-
tact illustrates the tendencies of language formation between these
two communities and the resulting power balances. "Consult" is one
illustrative word, together with its variations. Human rights and inter-
national economic advocates alike, since the creation of their respec-
tive institutions, have used consultation as the method to connect with
nation-states. Both have defined consultation similarly and use this
activity to understand state practices and influence their policies.
Agreement over this word enabled the World Bank to consent to con-
suit with human rights nongovernmental organizations as one of the
first formal cooperative breakthroughs between these communities. 199
Consultation was identified as an activity that did not require negotia-
tion over the definition itself, and in which both communities have
extensive experience and facility.
Perhaps more interesting is the development of new words or
word meanings previously not used by either community. For an ex-
ample of language creation, the IMF case is helpfuil. While the IMF
has been slow to make public statements about its responsibility vis a
vis human rights, it has promulgated a formal statement about the
"social dimensions" of its work.200 In this statement, the IMF recog-
nizes that it "has major implications for the three core issues of the
World Summit on Social Development (WSSD)-poverty alleviation,
promotion of employment, and social integration."20 1
Social integration-as defined in U.N. documents for the Social
Summit-concerns the ability of different groups in society to live to-
gether in productive and cooperative harmony and to accommodate
differences within a framework of common interest to the benefit of
all. Social integration implies justice for the individual and harmony
among different social groups and countries. It means integration of
disadvantaged and vulnerable groups by making all institutions of so-
ciety more accessible to them. 20 2 The IMF recognizes that "Vulnerable
199 See discussion of World Bank-NGO consultation supra Part II.
200 See discussion on IMF consideration of social issues infra note 163-165, and ac-
companying text. As economic and social developments are mutually reinforcing, these
policies are essential for reducing poverty and engendering social integration in the me-
dium term. At the same time, the IMF also recognizes the importance of sound social poli-
cies aimed directly at achieving social objectives. Increased attention to these aspects of the
IMF's work would serve to enhance the political sustainability of economic reforms.
201 IMF POLICY DIALOGUE, supra note 129, at 3.
202 See UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF TIlE NVORLD SUMMIT FOR SO-
CIAL DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.166/9 (1995), available at http://www.un.org/doc-
umen ts/ga/confl66/aconfl66-9.h tm (last visited Oct. 2, 2001).
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groups need to be protected through well-targeted social safety nets"
and that IMF-supported programs should improve access to social
services, including primary education and health. 20 3
The list of IMF "social issues"-poverty alleviation; employment;
social accommodation for disadvantaged individuals and groups; and
access to public service including health and education programs-
roughly corresponds to rights found in the ICCPR and ICESCR.
Poverty alleviation evokes the right to an adequate standard of living,
including food, clothing, and housing. These are rights protected by
nearly all of the ICESCR. The right to employment corresponds
specifically to Article 6 of the same document that protects the right
to work. Similarly, the created term "social integration" 2 4 and its
officially promulgated definition correspond to a number of rights
enumerated in both the ICESCR and ICCPR, including the right to
self-determination, 205 the right to be free from discrimination,206 and
the right to social involvement in society.20 7 Finally, the rights of access
to public services, including health care and schooling, are also pro-
tected in the ICESCR.
Instead of recognizing and citing these rights as the foundation
for the "social dimensions" of its work, the IMF currently distances
itself from human rights norms and documents by using ambiguous
language that loses the moral imperative and the legal efficacy of the
rights enumerated by foundational human rights documents.
It is encouraging that the IMF has made the step of at least in-
corporating "social issues." It is important to note, however, the nega-
tive implications of allowing an international institution to invent lan-
guage when it does not fully address the human rights problems to
which it claims to be attentive; it potentially could both demote the
legal potency as well as obfuscate the global familiarity that human
rights language has attained. It is important to retain the character of
a particular human right as a right, rather than allowing it to be
framed as a "social issue." One international legal scholar explains
that "characterization of a specific goal as a human right elevates it
above the rank and file of competing societal goals, gives it a degree
203 IMF POLICY DIALOGUE, supra note 129, at 2.
201 Id. at 3 n.1.
200 ICESCR, supra note 84, at art. 1; ICCPR, supra note 84, at art. 1.
206 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 84, at arts. 1, 2, 25; ICESCR, supra note 84, at arts. 18,
19.
207 This right is protected by a number of the provisions of both the ICCPR and the
ICESCR.
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of immunity from challenge, and generally endows it with an aura of
timelessness, absoluteness and universal validity."208
Arguably the entire discussion of sustainable development and
the alleviation of poverty is evidence of the continued interaction of
these two communities, the first rhetorical and substantive fruit of
their cooperation with one another. It is notable that joint publica-
tions such as A Better World for All have been framed entirely in this
language of poverty alleviation and attention to the world's least privi-
leged people. A trend that seems to be emerging in these joint docu-
ments is common reference to a particular topic of human concern as
a social issue rather than as a human right. These are all hints of an
emerging Pidgin language.
Each new linguistic development between the two communities
is, at the very least, a limited success in the attempt of the human
rights community to enter into the daily operations of its economic
counterparts. It is not possible to discern with any degree of certainty
whether this emerging pidgin language and the rights that it protects
is, on balance, emerging as weighted more heavily in favor of rights or
the economic domain. Nonetheless, the original political inequality of
the two worlds exposes the imperative of maintaining strong human
rights language in the negotiation over substantive institutional
change.
The language that is born from the negotiations between the in-
ternational economic and human rights domains is substantively im-
portant. If the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's
unconcealed reference to human rights in its statute209 is a substantive
victory, then it follows that the IMF's reluctance to use this term, by
inventing the terms "social issues," "social dimensions," or "social in-
tegration," and the WXTO's disinclination to even mention "social is-
sues", falls short of this mark.
As a language is learned-and certainly as it is invented-it can
limit the possibilities for substantive critique of a particular paradigm.
Carol Cohn explains, "learning [a] language is a transformative,
rather than an additive, process. When you choose to learn it you en-
ter a new mode of thinking."210 She illustrates that the language in
208 Philip Alston, Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development,
1 HARV. HUM. R-rs. Y.B. 3, 3 (1988).
201-Sirgun I. Skogly, Book Review: Human Rights in the New Europe: Problems and Progress,
89 A.J. INT'L. L. 242, 244 (1995).
210 Carol Cohn, Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals, 12 SIGNs 687,
716 (1987).
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which a profession is framed has the effect of transforming the entire
field and the individuals who participate therein. As a feminist and a
peace-loving person, Cohn entered a year long program in which she
was immersed in the world of defense intellectuals.211 During the pro-
cess of learning the specialized language of military strategy, she
found that she could not use that language to express her concerns
about militarization generally or about the sexism inherent in that
language. For example, she explains, "the word 'peace' is not a part of
this discourse. As close as one can come is 'strategic stability.'" 212 Im-
mersed in the accepted discourse of the military community, she
found it difficult to maintain the legitimacy of her convictions even
within the safety of her own head.213
The encounters between the economic and human rights com-
munities occur through the participation of the individuals who work
or advocate within each of those communities. Their commonalties
and sustained contact with one another hold risks for the advance-
ment of human rights. Cohn's description of the totalizing effects of
language modification, the ability of language modification to limit
alternative avenues for social change, as well as its capacity to alter the
substance of discourse and even the participants therein, suggest that
in order to sustain the rhetorical power of rights language and the
substance it carries with it, human rights advocates negotiating with
their economics-focused counierparts must consciously retain the
language of rights. Further, they must adamantly oppose language
that demotes human rights from their elevated status as rights to that
of "issues." This is important for the negotiations and discourse itself,
and essential in the language used to describe any outcomes from the
encounters in the form of statements, agreements, or treaties.
The compelling quality of human rights rhetoric has been a cor-
nerstone of the argument that the international economic domain
has a responsibility to incorporate human rights considerations into
all its activities. The aspirations set out in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and its progeny have the ability to move the imagina-
tion. This quality also has induced a wide range of communities and
interest groups to use the human rights system for their own protec-
tion. Since the creation of the UDHR, human rights law has gained
such popularity and achieved such status that nearly every modern
211 Id. at 688.
212 Id. at 708.
213 Id.
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cause has sought to use the language of human rights to give it
greater validity.214
When human rights advocates participate in negotiations with
the international economic community, they represent all individuals
who use the universal and regional mechanisms for human rights.
Language compromises in these encounters may have a detrimental
effect on the individuals who depend on the human rights system's
protections when negotiations yield insufficient results. Negative out-
comes immediately effect the ability to advance human rights through
economic instruments. But the negative consequences do not stop
there.
Language compromises have the effect of dominating the field of
interaction between the human rights domain and the international
economic domain with formal statements, agreements, or treaties that
effectively take the form of precedents for future interactions. As
such, these compromises may eliminate potential future actions on a
particular problem. For example, maintaining a language that
imperatively states that indigenous peoples have a right to self-
determination and the right to control their own territory is a far
stronger protection for indigenous peoples than language that sug-
gests that the interests of indigenous peoples will be balanced against
those of an economic actor wanting to make use of land traditionally
occupied by indigenous peoples. These two options roughly model
the protections declared by ILO Convention 107 and the relocation
policies of the World Bank, respectively. The cost/benefit method
employed in the second example, if widely adopted as a method for
dealing with the issue of indigenous people's land rights, could have
repercussions far beyond the specific example of the World Bank's
compromise on the issue. It establishes a model and precedent for the
future interaction of economic and social considerations that uses
solely economic language, foreclosing the powerful rhetoric of the
rights at the foundation of "social considerations" and "social issues."
Another example lies in the model of the international environ-
mental movement. This model is now so economics based, that coun-
tries may soon be able to purchase and sell pollution rights on trading
floors. It provides a good example of the defeats inherent in adopting
economic language for the protection of what was previously imag-
ined as an absolute right. While such a trading system may advance
the goals of reducing overall carbon-dioxide emissions, it also margi-
214 Howse & Mutua, supra note 7, 3.
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nalizes the morally-based idea that humans over-consume, and that
their over-consumption is inherently bad for the planet. It also virtu-
ally eliminates the utopian vision of a world without pollution. Creat-
ing a permanent and legitimate market for pollution certainly has the
global effect of marginalizing the idealistic language of environmental
rights. This example argues for avoiding this model of language adap-
tation while inventing the mechanisms for the international economic
community and the human rights community to cooperate. It also
demonstrates the human rights community's primary responsibility to
maintain and advance the strength of the individuals it aims to pro-
tect.
CONCLUSION
Our reconstructive task is a task of creating compelling alternative visions
of possible futures, a task of recognizing and developing alternative concep-
tions of rationality, a task of creating rich and imaginative alternative
voices-diverse voices whose conversations with each other will invent those
futtures.215
At this early stage of interactions between international human
rights advocates and international economic actors, the task for hu-
man rights advocates at the points of contact discussed in Part III is to
retain the compelling and utopian language of rights. As alternative
language such as that evidenced by the creation of terms such as "so-
cial issues," "social concerns," and "social integration" has clearly
started to emerge from these contacts, rights advocates should care-
fully consider the implications of compromising intact human rights
language.
Rights negotiators can more successfully maintain a strong rights-
based language if they are conscious of the implications of conceding
to new language that is overly dominated by economic rhetoric and
tools, as has occurred in the encounter between the international
economic and international environmental entities. To maintain the
full impact of the utopian vision of the human rights system, it is bet-
ter to employ imagination than to concede to what is simply the best
among pre-existing options. In this way, rights negotiators can arrive
at what is truly best for the advancement of human rights. The lan-
guage that emerges from this imaginative effort will be the language
215 Cohn, supra note 210, at 718.
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that connects the two domains and determines how international
economic institutions and actors will integrate, protect, and enforce
human rights. It will also determine which rights they will allow to
influence their activities.
It is essential to retain a "plain language" with respect to human
rights. As advocates of the plain language movement have noted, the
purpose of drafting in plain language is to enhance democracy and
the rule of law, by ensuring it is accessible to all people and that all
people understand that the language applies to them. 216 Given that
human rights have attained a high level of universal institutional, gov-
ernmental, and popular familiarity, maintaining a clear human rights
language is essential. The imperative of using clear language is espe-
cially strong in the context of human rights, where violations of estab-
lished law and standards results in violations of human dignity. The
language of human rights, in order to be understood by those it aims
to protect, must, above all, be intelligible and accessible. 217
As pidgin languages mature and are adopted by future genera-
tions as their own native tongues, they are termed "Creole" languages.
One characteristic of Creole languages is the totalizing effect they
have on the new generation that knows neither of the original lan-
guages from which the pidgin language emerged. The rapid forma-
tion of international economic language, international human rights
language, and the pidgin language they are forming in their contact
with one another suggests that both communities have a capacity for
rapid creation and transmutation of language. Accordingly, the future
Creole generation that will barely remember an era in which these
two communities did not cooperate is already rising. In considering
these future generations, human rights advocates and negotiators
have a responsibility to advance a language that retains real as well as
rhetorical potency in order to sustain the potential for utopian imagi-
nation so traditionally inherent in the human rights movement.
216 Ruth Sullivan, The Promise of Plain Language Drafting, 47 McGILL LJ. 97, 98 (2001).
217 See Barbara Stark, "Violations of Human Dignity" and Postmodern International Law, 27
YALEJ. INT'L L. 315, 315 (2002).
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